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Abstract 
Development of marine resources,  especially tuna,  is the key to national development for many newly-inde- 
pendent states of the South Pacific. They have industrialized  fishing through joint ventures-collaborations between 
host governments  and  multinational  corporations. Based  on  two years'  field research, this report illuminates the 
first decade  (1971-1981) of a tuna fishing joint venture between Taiyo Gyogyo of Tokyo, the largest fishing com- 
pany in the world, and the Solomon Islands Government. It  describes the history and operations of Solomon-Taiyo 
Limited,  and  the  subsequent  formation  of  National  Fisheries  Development, a second  joint  venture  specifically 
devoted to  the creation of a national, Solomon Islands fishing fleet. 
A detailed examination is made of the two poles of industrialization. The first pole is the internal dynamics of 
the joint ventures, the manner in which Taiyo's  capital, expertise,  management and world marketing networks are 
coupled with the human and natural resources of the Solomons. The second pole is the national work force. The 
report explores how workers' cultural backgrounds determine their work habits, expectations, aspirations and the 
social pressures they must shoulder as  citizens in both modern and traditional worlds. 
Introduction 
Joint ventures have dramatically changed the dynamics of tuna fishing in the South Pacific. 
Beginning in  the late 1960s, colonial powers sought new ways to generate sources of foreign exchange 
for their South Pacific dependencies. The understanding was that econodic development, so  long 
ignored, would have to  begin in earnest before independence was  granted.  International development 
agencies,  reflecting the philosophy of colonial administrations, not only aided the creation of new 
industries but initiated the search for them. With the extension of maritime jurisdiction from 12 to 
200 miles, the development of tuna fishing became an  obvious choice. Less obvious was the institu- 
tion of joint ventures and the impact of industrialization on the social economy. 
Several converging forces favored this line of development. Distant-water fishing fleets,  in par- 
ticular those of Japan, were exploiting the fish stocks of the South Pacific, especially tuna. Denied 
access to  these stocks they would suffer overcapitalization and unemployment, and economic dislo- cation in  their countries. Moreover, the advent of the 200-mile zone coincided with an escalating 
demand for tuna in the first world. It was  in  the best interests of foreign-owned tuna fleets to secure 
access to  these newly claimed resources. 
While the developing countries of the South Pacific have always had artisanal fisheries, they are 
limited in  the financial, managerial and technical resources needed to fully exploit offshore fisheries. 
This is especially so  for the tuna industry with its  sophisticated organization for catching, processing 
and marketing  the fish. Thus, there is a strong impetus for South Pacific countries to collaborate with 
transnational companies to extract the maximum benefits from their fisheries. These converging 
forces have inspired  joint venture agreements in Papua New Guinea,  Fiji, Nauru, the Solomon lslands 
and French Polynesia, as well as a series of licensing and processing arrangements in these and other 
countries. 
The present study centers on Solomon-Taiyo Limited, the joint venture established between the 
Japanese transnational, Taiyo Fishery Company, and the Solomon lslands government. This focus 
flows not only from the fact that tuna joint ventures offer an excellent example of development 
policy-the  Solomon lslands government perceives fisheries development as the key to attaining 
social objectives-but  also from the reality that other, mostly smaller, South Pacific states regard 
these ventures as test cases,  models to guide their future plans and policy. 
Our study centers on three entities that are interdependent yet separate in organization. The 
first and most important is the working community. This comprises not only the young men who 
labor for Solomon-Taiyo, but the villages from which they come and to which many, but not all, 
return after several years. These men and those they affect back home are the essence of national 
development. They are  at once the ostensible beneficiaries of economic progress and  its social 
result. As  a question of development it might be so  phrased: whether the Solomons is to build a 
permanent, skilled labor force, bound to  an urban environment, that restructures the balance between 
city and village, and thus the society and politics of both; or whether the labor force will remain 
transient and unskilled, always flowing back to  the village, and thus leaving things relatively un- 
changed. A clear point is that both lines of development, nowhere more pronounced than in the 
tension between industrialization and decentralization, are highly politicized. 
The second entity is Solomon-Taiyo Limited (STL), which couples Japanese  management, 
money and machines to the human and natural resources of the Solomons-  (SI).  Our focus is the 
history, structure and economics of the company, especially as  the interests of the Solomon lslands 
Government and those of Taiyo diverge.  In  Taiyo, the Solomons has joined itself to  a large trans- 
national with diverse and worldwide investments. When the Protectorate was established in 1893, 
the Taiyo family firm had already been in business for over a decade; today,  its  yearly sales,  in the 
neighborhood of $3.6 billion, far exceed the GNP of the Solomons. 
Solomon-Taiyo accounts for almost all the commercial tuna fishing done in Solomon waters, 
having a monopoly on fishing access within the 12-mile limit.  The enticement for an emerging 
state is national development through fishing industrialization. STL is an ethnic mix, with Japanese 
managers at Honiara head office and shorebases, Okinawan captains and crewmen, board directors 
from Commonwealth countries, as well as  the polyglot Solomon Island laborers. 
The third entity is the Solomon lslands Government (SIG), particularly its  national develop 
ment programs and policies  and how they have evolved with sophistication in transnational business. 
While STL hassubstantially increased government revenue and foreign exchange, it has not been 
greatly successful in the provision of social services or the transfer of technology and management 
skills; virtually no service program for training  nationals has been instituted.  The performance of 
STL has prompted the formation of National Fisheries Development (NFD). Itsgoal is to build and 
operate a fleet of skipjack catcher vessels under national command. Although Solomon-Taiyo owns 
25% of NFD, and the current contract commits NFD to selling its  catch to  the joint company,  the 
government perceives it as  a rising competitor. Most of the national hopes,  from training to  employ- 
ment to worker family housing, now rest with National Fisheries Development. The Solomon Islands claimed a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1978. Taiyo conti- 
nued to have a monopoly on the rich fishing grounds inside the Main Group Archipelago; this encom- 
passes the Slot (see Fig. 1) and 12-mile territorial seas  around the surrounding islands. The new 200- 
mile EEZ allowed thesolomons to  start to negotiate licensing agreements to sell further access rights. 
The Solomon Islands showing major localities mentioned in the text. 
The Japanese government stepped in to  work out a longlining accord for the extended zone. The SIG 
also granted licenses to Korean and Taiwanese vessels already longlining in  the area. The change was 
not in increased fishing in those more distant waters, but in the right of the SIG to collect fees for 
extant fisheries. The hidden costs to the SIG,  as to all littoral states,  are the surveillance and monitor- 
ing of the new license agreements. 
This study is an anthropologist's assessment of the impact of fishing industrialization on a 
South Pacific country, with the Solomon Islands the salient example. The study's  primary objec- 
tives are: 
1.  to detail the impact of fishing industrialization and development policy on the social 
economy of the village 
2.  to describe the STL and N  FD workers and their points of view; specifically how their cul- 
tural backgrounds inform their work habits, expectations, aspirations, and the social pres- 
sure that they must shoulder as citizens in  both modern and traditional worlds to providean  account of the joint venture, especially the silent political interests and under- 
currents of ethnicity that shape much of the face-to-face interaction between Islanders, 
Europeans and Japanese 
to  elucidate how the institutional structure of Taiyo Fishery Company informs the policies, 
negotiating practices, and pressures on overseas managers,  and to identify arrangements 
between the transnational and workers that are profitable and fair for both parties 
to put forward suggestions for fisheries development in the Solomon Islands, particularly 
concerning the impact of the industrialization and the national development of human 
resources 
to indicate the regional implications of STL and NFD, in particular (a) how neighboring 
states can benefit from the SI experience in skipjack development and (b) how the sharing 
of industrial fishing information and cooperation through the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(F  FA) can strengthen the region. 
Our enterprise departs from mainstream studies on development. Most report the objective 
results of programs, typically expressed in statistics relating to the amount of invested capital, 
projected returns, the percent of employees of local origin, production schedules and income levels. 
Without questioning the obvious merit of such data-indeed  we  use them throughout the study-we 
believe there is  another, less visible side of development. One reason that many reports center on the 
objective is  that the authors do not have the time, training, or linguistic resources to look beyond 
development, to  see it from the perspective of the beneficiaries. Yet,  national development is a 
social process owing as much to internal conditioning as  to outside agencies. A real question is how 
successfully do development programs interplay with the existing social system. A skilled and reliable 
Solomon Islands working community does not rise like the Pacific tides at an appointed hour, nor 
as  a direct realization of any development program. It  is present at its own making, having an active 
hand in the outcome. 
A point implicit throughout the analysis is that cultures are integrated wholes. To phrase it in 
economic argot, Solomon Island society is a thoroughly integrated structure, all of its parts are inter- 
linked and mutually reinforcing. A development program cannot transform economic conditions 
without transforming social,  political, moral, and legal conditions as well. The repercussions will 
often undermine an economically sound program. To institute a change without knowing the likely 
consequences is to invite failure. Frequently, small alterations that do not materially damage the 
economics are the real difference between success and failure. A development plan should anticipate 
its effects. Only then can it make provisions for minimizing its  impact, or create a substitute for the 
social support it has removed. 
There is a large body of anthropological writings that could help us understand the seeds and 
conditions of change in the third world. More, there are field workers with years of experience at 
the village level and a good knowledge of the language. 
In the West Pacific, the basic literature on development work includes Bedford and Mamak 
(1975,1976),  Boutilier (1978,1979), Boutilier etal. (1978), Chapman (1970), Ogan (19721, Daven- 
port (1961,1962),  Pitt (1  WO),  Meltzoff and LiPuma (in press), Rew (1974), Rodman and Cooper 
(1  979), and Salisbury (1  970). For references outside the West  Pacific see  van der Pas'  (1  973) anno- 
tated bibliography. For a specific development study of fishing see Lawson and Kwei (1974) and 
Johnson (1  977). 
Unfortunately, anthropologists  rarely have applied their insights or experience, and only recently 
have they begun to participate in development projects.  They have remained aloof especially from 
industrialization projects, preferring to write of culture in the past or the modest change from cash 
cropping.  This report is a small effort to begin to redress this omission. 
Development projects, especially joint ventures, are politically sensitive, and the investigator's 
attempts to gain access to information is sometimes curtailed or frustrated.  Thus,  STL provided 
data on the amount of tuna produced and the number of local employees but other information 
was impossible to obtain directly. Within the Solomon Islands government, the Ministry of Youth and Cultural Affairs, which 
sponsored the study, was extremely supportive. Some other departments were also supportive, includ- 
ing Central Planning, Home Affairs, Trade Labor and Industry, Hansard and Statistics. However, 
while many individual ministerial officials were open and forthright, others were guarded or evasive. 
STL was naturally reticent to divulge information on politically sensitive issues like baitfishing. Bait- 
fishing involves village politics and is potentially divisive. Thus, although local leaders were support- 
ive, it was not possible to visit prime baitfishing villages. 
The political complications were inevitable and instructive, though they made discovering how 
and why STL works an intricate research project.  Certainly any understanding needs to encompass 
not merely the mechanics of the development project, but how the people involved influence it  to 
further their own ends.  They enlist the project for purposes that far transcend,  and are sometimes 
counterproductive to,  its development. To cite only the obvious,  local politicians may wish to 
accumulate power or wealth for their own province or village, expatriates to advance their own over- 
seas careers, workers to buy a wife or political leverage back home, Japan to promote its economic 
interests in  the South Pacific. Because of the sensitive and controversial nature of much of the informa- 
tion collected, every attempt was  made to corroborate it from other sources. What emerges from 
this extensive fieldwork is, we  believe, a study with useful insights into the formulation and imple- 
mentation of a joint venture, with important lessons for those embarking on similar negotiations 
elsewhere in the South Pacific. 
The various issues investigated and locations of fieldwork were as  follows: 
Biological issues:  For fisheries policy and technology, the biology experts shared their data at 
Scripps Oceanographic Institute, National Marine Fisheries Service at La Jolla and Honolulu, the 
South Pacific Commissionrs  Skipjack Tagging Programme in Noumea, New Caledonia, and at  the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. The University of the South Pacific, Suva,  Fiji, and 
Fisheries Departments in Suva,  Fiji, American and Western Samoa,  and Port Moresby also supplied 
valuable information. 
Local Processingand Pricing: Comparative data were obtained by visiting Zamboanga, southern 
Philippines, the developing cannery base for the Moro Gulf where 70% of the Philippine skipjack are 
taken; Pago Pago,  American Samoa; Ovalau Island, Fiji where the government has a joint venture 
with the C.  ltoh Company; Kavieng, New Britain, proposed site of the Starkist Papua New Guinea 
cannery, and Port Moresby to interview officials in Finance, Primary Industry, and Legal Depart- 
ments; and Terminal Island, California, the Starkist overseas development headquarters. 
Overseas Tuna Fishing and Marketing by Japanese  Transnationals: This involved interviewing 
officials from the Japan Tuna Association and from Taiyo and Mitsubishi; working out of Starkist 
Asia's  Tokyo office to observe their international tuna marketing and back-up operations; analyzing 
price schedules for tuna at  major fish markets and landing ports in Japan; collecting life histories of 
tuna charter boat owners and captains who fish in the Solomons and New Guinea for the tuna 
transnationals; and a one month intensive Japanese course at  the Australian National University and 
ongoing language study. 
Workers:  Research here centered on visiting the shorebase  at Tulagi to interview workers, 
Okinawan fishermen, and Taiyo, NFD and STL managers; the Honiara headquarters of Taiyo, STL, 
NFD and Fisheries Department; and the Malaitan villages of Fanalei, Walande and Sara. 
The Solomon Islands 
SETTING 
The Solomon Islands form one of the principle archipelagos of Melanesia, lying between 5"s 
and 12"s. Stretching in a double chain across the western Pacific are the six main islands-Choiseul, 
Isabel,  Malaita,  New Georgia,  Guadalcanal,  and San  Cristobal-and  numerous smaller ones.  The 
islands are mountainous and covered by tropical rain forests; ringing them are mangrove swamps 
which serve as nurseries for marine life. The land area of the Solomons covers only 27,566  km2. However, the archipelago extends 
some  1,400  km from one extremity to the other, and with the advent of the 200-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), the Solomons control more than 100,000  km2 of the western Pacific, much 
of it rich in fish, particularly tuna. Fish migrate through the channel between the double chain of 
islands, feeding on the baitfish that abound in the passages,  lagoons and reefs. 
Most Solomon Islanders live in  small, dispersed settlements along the coast.  Inland communities 
usually have no tradition of the sea and tend to be even smaller in size. No less than 80% of the islands' 
population resides in villages of fewer than 200,  although urban centers are growing in response to 
the growth in industry.Thevillage is  still  the cornerstone of Solomon Islands life, still highly influential 
in the social economy. Village members recognize common descent and intermarriage as  basic prin- 
ciples of relationship. The ethic is  to own land communally, share food, money, property and business 
connections; there is an enduring solidarity that transcends thevillage setting and becomes an  impor- 
tant dimension of urban life, influencing the behavior of government officials, business leaders,  indus- 
trial workers and artisans. Indeed, what Solomon Islanders call the "wontok"  system (see p. 38)  is 
the social thread tying together many economic, political and legal relationships. 
Subsistence production is the primary industry of rural households. Solomon Islanders are most 
knowledgeable and skillful in farming and fishing; and they do much subsistence production even in 
urban areas. Wage income carries only about a quarter of the country's households; most people work 
for money only intermittently. The principal crops grown are cassava,  yams, taro, coconuts, bananas 
and papaya. Depending on locale and season,  people hunt iguanas, turtles, porpoises, birds, as  well as 
bonito, kingfish and many reef fishes. Regional differences in ecology and culture generate the ex- 
change of goods,  such as fish, porpoise teeth and shells (both used as custom wealth), building woods, 
pigs and vegetable foodstuffs. 
The Solomons derive export income almost entirely from agricultural resources. Copra, fish 
(predominantly  tuna), timber, and palm oil and kernels earn more than 80% of total receipts. Because 
export income derives from only a handful of products which have had little  or no processing, and 
because the price of these products has been unstable for at least a decade, earnings have fluctuated 
erratically from one year to the next. This is particularly true for copra and tuna which account for 
nearly 50% of exports. This uncertainty, typical of small-island economies, makes long term planning 
difficult. In addition, it tends to undermine the credibility of development programs. 
As  in many South Pacific countries, export production in the Solomons is structured along 
regional, ethnic and economic lines. Large-scale commercial ventures-mostly  owned, financed, and 
operated by Europeans-predominate.  Smallholders, mostly Solomon Islanders, have only a small 
share of production and not infrequently encounter problems in marketing their goods (e.g.,  trans- 
portation). Rural communities are marginally involved in commercial enterprise and have few oppor- 
tunities for earning cash on a consistent and reliable basis. Guadalcana1,with  its  fertile plains, European 
population, and transnational-owned industry, and New Georgia, the economic and cultural center 
of the western provinces, have strong concentrations of large and smallholder operations and market 
the majority of exports. Income disparities-for  example, New Georgia cash crop income is triple 
that of Malaita and San Cristobal-reflect  island differences. The results are regional differences in 
wealth, power and political commitment. 
SOCIAL HISTORY 
Many contemporary Solomon Islands attitudes, ethics and behaviors that determine the course 
of development, have roots in colonial history. This is  particularly  true in the fields of labor relations, 
marketing, wage employment, economic expectations and technology. All have been defined and 
redefined within the context of contact. The Solomons have not had a pacific history. They have 
endured wholesale labor recruitment (blackbirding) (Corris 1973); the evangelical tide of nearly a 
dozen western missions; a turbulent process of pacification in which considerable British and Islander 
blood was shed (Boutilier 1979); the occupation by Japanese, then American forces during World War  I  I; a strong Marching Rule cargo cult, and secessionist movements. Today and in the years to 
come the challenge is to unify more than 70 cultures, all linguistically separate and varying in their 
degree of, and receptivity towards, national development. The most significant result of the Solomon 
Islands experience has been the emergence of economic beliefs and practices which blend custom 
and capitalism in a specific way. 
Intensive contact with Europeans and their economic interests dates from the colonial labor 
trade (Parnaby 1964). Beginning in the 1860s, blackbirders enticed Islanders to work on the sugar 
plantations  of Queensland and Fiji.There was asteady stream of recruits, probably some 30,000  before 
the turn of the century; on Malaita, the most heavily recruited island, a third of the male labor force 
was indentured at any point in  time. But it  was  not only this absence which transformed the economy. 
Workers were paid in trade goods and so vast amounts of material culture entered the Solomons. Iron 
tools eased the burden of cultivation and allowed the more rapid manufacture of custom money. 
Firearms made a new business of hunting, not to mention warfare (White 1979), and people devel- 
oped a taste for mirrors, beads and other luxury itenis. The influx of new goods coupled with the 
capacity to produce old ones more rapidly transformed values and created a permanent place for 
western goods within the social economy. 
Blackbirding initiated a pattern of labor migration that became woven into the society. In  order 
to obtain select western goods (including money) and experience the larger, more European world, 
men volunteer for contract labor thereby securing their place in the village polity. They envision 
their period of service concretely as: 
1)  temporary, with no expectation of training or career 
2)  an opportunity to earn a small amount of individual wealth which they can distribute in 
their name 
3)  done in the company of male relatives of the same  age  cohort (wives, children or sisters 
remain in the village) 
4)  a rite of passage by which they enter manhood. 
Although Britain outlawed blackbirding in 1904, there has been a continuous demand for such 
labor interrupted only by the 1930's copra depression, the 1942 Japanese invasion, and the Marching 
Rule Movement from 1945 to 1949. Given this demand for unskilled labor, it  is not surprising that 
the pattern of temporary wage employment remains strong. 
On 7 July 1978, the Solomons ended more than 80 years of British rule, although the years of 
development, to transform the British Solomon Islands Protectorate into a self-reliant state, were 
just beginning. Gun salutes from Commonwealth and US  Navy warships commemorated Indepen- 
dence,  and perhaps also their respective roles in contact history. Internal affairs, however, were  less 
sanguine; the western province delayed celebration after prolonged threats of secession. 
This regionalism may well mean that fisheries development, if not well-planned politically, will 
finance secessionist movements. It is no secret, for example, that the western province perceives the 
development of a  tuna and a copra base  at  Noro, New Georgia,  as the key to economic independence 
and political leverage. The projected Noro tuna cannery would be five times larger than the present 
one at  Tulagi, with the copra wharf capable of handling global shipping. The revenues generated from 
such projects are expected to be considerable. 
The most important counterweight to regionalism is the national school system which brings 
together a wide variety of the best students from across the Islands. Education and contact promote 
intergroup friendships and also marriage. They serve to generate a corps of elites who demonstrate 
solidarity regardless of island of origin or language. The best educated have become the civil service 
elite who manage the government. Similarly, many of the politicians, though lacking formal educa- 
tion, have formed inter-island allegiances. Labor stints on plantations and fishing bases also serve as 
an  instrument of national integration, although to a lesser  extent because wontoks (see p.  38) 
associate mostly with each other. 
Whether on the plantation or across the negotiating table, the interplay of ethnic feelings among Solomon Islanders, British-Australian  and Japanese inflect the tenor of labor relations. Such feelings 
generally lead an underground existence, as the spirit of cooperation is the official point of view. But 
time and recent experience have not so  much erased the prejudices born in  World War I  I  as  transmuted 
them. The Japanese invasion force took control of the Solomons in 1942. The British were forced 
to  flee the island and instructed the people to  have minimal contact with Japanese. Local plantations, 
already in a serious state of depression, terminated their operations.  For obvious reasons,  British 
expatriates hated and feared the Japanese, and transmitted these feelings to the Solomon Islanders. 
The Japanese, on their part, were absorbed in the war effort and made scant attempt to win the 
loyalty and friendship of the local populace. Also, they could speak neither English nor Pidgin and 
were culturally conditioned  to maintain distance. When the American military penetrated the central 
Solomons the British drafted as many able-bodied men as  they could, transporting them to work for 
the Americans as everything  from day laborers to  bush scouts. An unprecedented  situation,far removed 
from the colonial experience, developed. Solomon Islanders shared the dangers as well as  the vast 
supplies of war with a new,  more egalitarian-minded, English-speaking people. By sharing freely and 
socializing with Islanders, the Americans unknowingly triggered a deep-seated cultural response: 
brotherhood and the "wontok"  system. Seeing black American soldiers only confirmed indigenous 
perception. Not surprisingly, many Solomon Islandersadopted their American "brothers"  attitude 
towards the Japanese. However, this antipathy  was not deep-rooted  or universal. Villagers on Malaita, 
where there was  no fighting, rescued the victims of isolated plane crashes regardless of nationality. 
GOVERNMENT AND POLICY 
The Solomon Islands system of government is  a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral legis- 
lature. The National Parliament consists of 38 members,  including the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet. A party system is  still in its infancy; there are no strong platforms or philosophy and 
members switch parties easily and without stigma. Almost all members of Parliament vote as  inde- 
pendents, making it more difficult to reach a rapid consensus on major policy issues. This reflects 
the traditional political system which is based on consensual rather than adversary principles, and 
thus frowns on factions. 
Development planning, especially as linked to decentralization, has been a paramount goal. 
Two development plans have been formulated: the first ('1975-1979) was  to prepare the country for 
independence and greater self-reliance, and the second (1980-1984)  is to make strong headway in 
industry and infrastructure. 
The development plans aim to entice foreign investment and develop primary industries, such 
as  fisheries and timber, through joint ventures with foreign corporations. The plans envision that the 
developing industries will furnish adequate foreign exchange when present UK assistance winds down. 
However, they also call for the Solomons to boost national welfare by acquiring control over some 
corporations. The key step is localizing  technical and managerial jobs traditionally held by foreigners. 
While both aims of the national plans are worthwhile, they conflict in many issues and have resulted 
in an investment climate that is lukewarm. Direct foreign investment, chiefly by British, American 
and Japanese firms, is running  at  about US$5 million per annum, hardly outstanding  given the natu- 
ral resources of the Islands. 
The Tuna Fishery 
The commercially important tunas in the Pacific include skipjack (Katsuwonuspelamis), alba- 
core (Thunnus alalunga), bigeye (Thunnus obesus), yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), and two species 
of bluefin, the southern bluefin (Thunnusmaccoyii) and the Pacific bluefin (Thunnus thynnusl. Skip- 
jack, also commonly known as  bonito, is the most abundant. Its  commercial and international impor- 
tance has been increasing in response to  the escalating demand for tuna, principally by first-world 
countries. The structure of skipjack populations in the Pacific is complex and by no means fully under- 
stood. While it is known that spawning occurs in equatorial seas where water temperature rarely dips 
below 28"C, and that the young tuna migrate towards the edge of their range for pre-reproductive 
grazing (Bardach and Matsuda 1979), skipjack migration patterns remain mostly an enigma. 
In the course of their migration, schools of skipjack might pass through the territorial waters 
of different littoral states, giving each state a limited and serial opportunity to exploit a given school 
of skipjack. Some states have access mostly to juvenile populations, others primarily to adults. It is 
not unusual, for example, to  catch up to 50% "rats"  (under40  cm long) in  the Philippines but almost 
no juveniles in more eastern waters. 
Central to the skipjack fishery and its management is the relative vulnerability of the species to 
the three typesof commercial gear: longline, pole and line, and purse seine.  Decisions on appropriate 
gear ride lesson biological concerns than on political, social and fiscal ones.  Landing price, fuel costs, 
tuna quotas, access to baitfish, availability of labor, offloading facilities and local demands are all 
taken into  account. Significantly, gear selection is a critical point at  which the social benefits of fish- 
ing (e.g.,  employment, manpower training) collide with pecuniary interests. 
Longlining  is used to catch the deepswimming billfish and tuna, like albacore and bluefin. The 
skipjack associate in swift surface schools, usually of 2 to 3 t, but which can aggregate into large 
schools on occasions; 500 t being known in  the Solomons. Accordingly, the skipjack are principally 
vulnerable to pole and line and purse seine. The latter is the most technologically sophisticated and 
capital intensive of the fishing methods. When a seiner locates a school, the seine net is deployed in 
a huge circle around the skipjack using a powerful tender or another fishing vessel. The closing steps 
are to purse the bottom line, then the top, and to brail the fish into icing or freezing holds. Because 
skipjack will swim under the seine net if  not discouraged from doing so  by cold layers of water,  purse 
seining was unsuccessful in  thewestern Pacific until combined with the use of floating rafts orpayaos 
(=raft),  a traditional Philippine fishing gear to which fish are attracted. Fishermen anchor thepayao 
at sea,  its underside rigged with palm fronds or other materials. The skipjack are attracted and congre- 
gate in  the shelter of the raft and when concentrations of fish are large enough, the purse seiner 
closes in and harvests the catch, The use of payaos made purse seining of this species economically 
viable. Recently,payaos have given way to the use of deeper nets to contain the tuna. 
Pole-and-line  vessels in the Solomons, usually of 59 t, have a jutting prow with a fishing plat- 
form. Water-spray nozzles stud the sides of the vessel;  they are used to disrupt the water surface 
with a spray to  veil the fishermen and simulate feeding frenzy. The tuna are chummed using live 
bait from the foredeck wells. The best bait species do not scatter but remain near but not beneath 
the boat. If  the bait scatters, the tuna will be drawn out of range of the vessel. As  the skipjack attack 
the baitfish, they also bite fishermen's  lures and are slung onto the deck,  losing the barbless hook in 
the process. Experienced fishermen maintain a steady rhythm, flicking fish after fish on board while 
the frenzy lasts. The Japanese have devised a labor-saving  automatic poling device, but the mechanical 
fishing arms lack human timing and sensitivity. 
A most significant feature of pole and line is that it demands the support of a parallel fishery 
to supply live bait. This has proven problematic in the Solomons despite easily caught, adequate 
supplies of baitfish. Commercial fishermen must capture bait from the Islands' encircling reefs, all 
of which the villagers own by tradition, yet not in the sense  of Western private property, a point 
baffling to both Japanese and American company officials. According to Solomon Islands custom, a 
clan as  a whole owns a reef in perpetuity; no one has the right to alienate it without the consent of 
the clan body, and profits gleaned from it must be shared. A chief or big-man has jurisdiction over 
the reefs owned by his clan, but  this amounts to no more than a stewardship-the  reefs are his wards. 
Members of other clans in the village have inalienable rights to  the reef's  resources, provided they 
compensate the chief or big-man, and thus his clan, with fish, money, services or political allegiance. 
Thus, it is not clear whether commercial baitfishers should compensate the clan, the chief, other 
reef users or some combination thereof. Skipjack occur in  very large numbers over an immense area of the Pacific. Indicators of resource 
size are that catches in recent years have continued to increase proportionately with increased fish- 
ing effort, and the maximum  sustainable yields are thought to be well above present landings. There 
are serious gaps in the scientific understanding of skipjack biology, e.g.,  the number and distribution 
and degree of interaction  of separate stocks; the growth, recruitment, natural mortality rates and 
migration habits are still not well known. 
The South Pacific skipjack fishery was examined by the South Pacific Commission in a four-year 
biological study-The  Skipjack Survey and Assessment Programme-completed  in September 1981. 
Data from the Programme are still being analyzed. An interim report on the activities of the Pro- 
gramme in  thesolomon Islands is available (Kearney and Lewis 1978) and the final report is expected 
to provide an assessment of both skipjack and baitfish resources of the Solomon Islands. 
The relationship between catch and effort in  a fishery is typically thought of as  a parabolic 
curve in which the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) occurs at some intermediate level of fishing 
effort and stock size (Gulland 1977,1978). It has been shown that the attainment of MSY is not 
usually a  suitable objective in  a fishery. This led to  the concept of optimum sustainable yield (Roedel 
1975), in which social, economic and often ethical concerns, which inextricably tie management to 
politics, are also considered. Developing countries may regard potential benefits from their fisheries 
primarily in terms of sources of employment and food, or as  a means of obtaining foreign exchange 
and modern technology rather than trying to maximize profits. 
The reality is that fisheries management is an ongoing process in which diverse groups, from 
government departments to foreign fishing fleets, push for social and economic interests that are 
not infrequently at odds. This is true for the skipjack industry in general and its  joint ventures in 
particular. 
The Solomon-Taiyo Joint Venture 
ORIGINS 
All of the interest in  the habits of skipjack, methods of exploitation, access to baitfish, and fish- 
eries management flow from thevalue of tuna as  a marketable resource. As  late as  1970, no commer- 
cial tuna fishing was done in Solomon Islands waters.  In 1973 the joint venture, Solomon-Taiyo 
Limited, was established and five years later National Fisheries Development (NFD) was formed. By 
1977 the Solomons was deriving more than 8 million dollars (US) yearly from skipjack operations 
(South Pacific Commission 1978) and fishing accounted for nearly 30% of the value of all exports 
(SI Statistical Yearbook 1979). Equally great is the potential for national development through 
employment, access to modern technology and manpower training. 
Four main changes motivated the making of joint ventures in the South Pacific; or,  more 
precisely, made it mutually  advantageous for transnational corporations and less developed countries 
to  join hands. The first is  that the demand for tuna worldwide rose to the point where current fish- 
ing grounds could no longer easily support it. FA0  figures indicate that in the past 20 years there 
has been a more or less steady upswing in demand for tuna,  mostly in  Japan, the United States and 
the European Economic Community (EEC). It  became increasingly difficult for albacore, yellowfin 
and big-eye  tuna fisheries to  keep pace without ruining  the stocks or encountering economic problems. 
For example, the influential Japanese Fisheries Agency  (1979)  estimated that longliners now exploit 
yellowfin at near-maximum levels, and that greater fishing intensity would prove not only economi- 
cally unviable but  would damage the stocks. The result has been a shift towards skipjack in the past 
decade. 
The second change was  major revision in the international law of the sea.  Many littoral states 
have extended their maritime jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles, as well as invoking an archipelagic 
principle. They have gained exclusive economic rights to the seabed minerals, including oil, and to 
all fisheries. The individual Pacific states have increased their economic zones more than tenfold while the international commons has shrunk to only a fraction of the Pacific. The developing coun- 
tries of the South Pacific now have possession of huge fishery resources, principally tuna and related 
species. However, while they have always had artisanal fishing-indigenouscuItures that hunted bonito 
from sewn-plank canoes-they  lacked the capital, skills and technology to initiate a fishing industry 
alone. 
The third change was the expansion of the Japanese fishing industry across the Pacific (Junko 
1980). Difficulties in  obtaining baitfish, and then fishing grounds once 200-mile limits came into 
effect, as well as  a shortage of manpower, inspired this expansion. In 1963-64  advances in live-bait 
handling techniques enabled the Japanese to  expand into southern waters. The impetus to  develop 
year-round fishing for their pole-and-line  boats blossomed into a "skipjack boom" (Suda 1972). 
A decade later, the number of vessels had burgeoned without a corresponding increase in the avail- 
able fishing grounds. Vessel size was also growing, but without any further improvements in bait- 
handling  techniques. There developed a constant struggle to  fill the holds before the baitfish perished, 
and indeed overhead rose and catch per unit effort fell. In  short, the industry was over-capitalized. 
To make matters worse, the same expanding Japanese economy that had financed the capitalization 
made it more difficult to  recruit fishermen. With income levels high and unemployment low, few 
Japanese were willing to  give up homelife for distant-water fishing. 
As  the Japanese fishing expanded into southern waters it became necessary to either improve 
bait transport or methods of offshore capture. But neither technical knot was readily broken, and 
the Japan Fisheries  Agency suggested circumventing the problem through licensing and joint venture 
agreements with resource owners. In 1971, Taiyo-Gyogyo (Fisheries Corporation) negotiated an 
agreement with the then British administration of the Solomons. In  this, Taiyo was  following her 
national competitors who had recently worked out arrangements with the Australian administration 
of Papua New Guinea.  From the transnationals' perspective the situations were  promising: the 
passages and lagoons of the Solomons and Papua New Guinea held the best baitfishing areas in the 
South Pacific; there was a willing and inexpensive labor force; and the tuna resources were rich. For 
skilled labor they could tap the Okinawan fishing masters and essermen (baitmen) from Sarahama, 
Miyako Island, who would sail their fleet of second-hand pole boats down to the Solomons and 
Papua New Guinea, and charter vessel and expertise at lowest prices. The Okinawans were at home 
in  the tropical seas,  having fished the waters of Micronesia before World War  I  I, and proved successful 
skipjack fishermen. Moreover, the unskilled component of the crew on the chartered boats was 
composed of Islanders, thus satisfying the government condition that foreign companies employ 
nationals and initiate localization. With one swift agreement the transnationals settled the baitfish 
and manpower problems, hence minimizing the imminent danger to  the Japanese tuna fishing industry 
posed by  the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
The fourth change was in the political situation in South Pacific States. Awakening in the late 
1960s  was a conscience of independence  that would culminate in  the emergence of Papua New Guinea, 
the Solomons, and other states. Their colonial history had long since tied independence to  the task 
of generating a sound social economy capable of supporting further development programs. For the 
Solomons especially the expansion of Japanese fishing interests and the revisions of the law of the 
sea  could not have come at a more auspicious time. With independence on the horizon, Taiyo made 
its offer to conduct a pilot study;  if skipjack operations proved fruitful a long-term agreement 
would follow. The British were quick to seize the opportunity of tuna industrialization. It  would 
furnish an immediate and hopefully lasting source of economic stability. That the Solomon Islands, 
like other South Pacific states,  has a limited resource base, served to magnify the importance of 
Taiyo's offer. 
The goals of the two parties, Taiyo and SIG, were,  and still are,  quite divergent: 
Taiyo, and from a much broader perspective a Japanese government actively involved in creat- 
ing a global business diplomacy, desires that STL: 
1 -  supply tuna for Taiyo and Japanese  marketing, distribution, and trade networks on a 
long-term basis 2 -  purchase products, rent equipment and borrow money from Taiyo and its subsidiaries, 
who are in turn purchasers and agents for other Japanese companies 
3 -  build good will to promote further business dealing between the Solomons and Japanese 
companies 
4 -  expand as a purchaser and supplier to benefit Japan in  general and Taiyo more specific- 
ally 
5 -  exclude other, especially nonJapanese, fishing companies while increasing STL quotas. 
The SIG political elite, and from a narrower viewpoint, local politicians and leaders want STL 
to: 
1 -  generate foreign exchange credits for an economy that must import appreciable amounts 
of raw materials and finished products 
2 -  produce substantial revenues to strengthen the central government and finance capital 
improvements 
3 -  stimulate the evolution of a skilled, stable, and fluid labor force willing to work at inter- 
nationally competitive rates 
4 -  provide  the country with modern technology in fishing and related operations, particularly 
canning 
5 -  acclimate Solomon Islanders to industrial machinery and hardware, and train them to work 
with it 
6 -  serve as  a base for expanding the industrial infrastructure that permits and lures other 
industry 
7 -  aid rural development through the dispersal of baitfish royalties to local communities. 
THE HISTORY OF SOLOMON-TAIYO 
Around 1970 Taiyo began to  survey fishing potential in  the southwest Pacific, notably the waters 
of Papua New Guinea.  Fishing was found favorable, but competitors outmaneuvered Taiyo, which 
then turned its  attention to the then British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP). Company and 
government officials met for a series of talks and Taiyo proffered a proposal to undertake a fishing 
survey at no cost to the government. It  then flew the key government officials to  Tokyo where 
they signed on 28 April 1971 a brief "Memorandum of Understanding." It  covered only in the broad- 
est strokes the intent and limits of the Taiyo survey. Importantly, it was signed without the knowl- 
edge of the full Governing ~ouncial.' 
Colonial administrators  sensed that the Islands' politicians and people would not appreciate the 
long-term benefits of  a fishing industry. Rather, they would focus on their distrust of the Japanese, 
a legacy of World War  II, and their fear that outsiders would "steal"  fish and shells. The agreement 
did indeed arouse local ire that only slowly and never fully subsided. 
The "memorandum"  outlined  a  survey to  assess skipjack and baitfish  resources and the potential 
for a locally-based  fishing industry. In exchange for fishing rights Taiyo assented to: 
-  "provide the Government with a full report on its  survey at  two monthly intervals" 
-  "employ Solomon Islanders-to  the maximum extent feasible" 
-  "provide the Government with a proposal concerning the establishment of a locally-based 
fishing industry" 
For the British negotiators the final provision  was the essence of the matter, the rest of the agreement 
basically a lure. The "Memorandum"  was,  however, only a single-page document with omissions that 
distinctly favored Taiyo. It gave the company free fishing access to all Solomon Island waters (to  the 
'Under BSIP Councial System the British High Commissioner was the chairman of the Governing Councial Private Committee. 
This committee was  composed of Committee Chairmen appointed by the High Commissioner. British advisors to each committee 
appeared with them to explain and advise'on technical matters. 12-mile limit) for the duration of the survey (18 months). And as survey operations developed, their 
initial attractiveness to the government quickly dimmed, for although the survey was  "risk  free"  it 
was also expressly commercial and became highly profitable.  From the outset, Taiyo's four catcher 
boats and two refrigeration ships made good catches which were frozen and exported to Japan.  In 
addition, Taiyo exported not only skipjack, as  the British had envisioned, but baitfish. The search 
for live bait was,  after all, one of Taiyo's prime reasons for coming to  the southwest Pacific. Its own 
Fish Resources Survey Plan submitted to the government called for the export of live bait for Japa- 
nese fishing vessels elsewhere. 
Local resentment flared as  some Solomon Islands politicians and villagers alleged that the Japa- 
nese were being handed their bait and tuna free. Recall that at  this time the Solomons administrators 
were focused on unearthing  a source of revenue for a Protectorate approaching independence. Their 
lack of experience in fisheries matters was compounded by the absence of a public forum. It was 
not until the survey was well underway that the Solomons realized the advantages of eliciting expert 
advice from FAO. 
In September 1971, four months into  the agreement, Taiyo reported catching 790 t of skipjack 
at an attractive catch per unit of effort. Following this initial bonanza Taiyo sought to augment its 
"research"  by adding 11 catchers and 3 refrigeration ships to the original fleet. Government nego- 
tiators, wiser for experience and burned by public criticism, insisted on revising the contract. They 
negotiated a "Further Memorandum of Understanding" which was  both more detailed and more 
focused.  In return for the right to deploy additional vessels,  Taiyo agreed 
-  "not to export live bait" 
-  "to pay the Government a premium of A$500 upon each catcher for each month of opera- 
tion"* 
-  "to reduce the survey from eighteen to fifteen months" 
The most crucial clauses of the revised agreement outlined the content of any future accord. The 
Japanese fishing industry, after a decade of expansion, was  now consolidating and Taiyo was  under 
pressure to retain access to  the new and lucrative resources of the Solomons. In  a show of good faith, 
Taiyo made a commitment towards establishing a locally-registered and jointly-owned, shore-based 
industry that would process locally whenever feasible and employ and train nationals to  the maximum 
extent possible. 
During the survey, Taiyo caught in excess of 12,000 t of skipjack, and enough bait to permit 
even larger operations. Although slowed by two cyclones, each catcher averaged more than 3 t of 
fish per working day. The company netted several million dollars from the venture; in return the 
Solomons gained a well-managed survey and a lesson in transnational business. 
Towards the termination of the survey,Taiyo produced  a feasibility study which advocated the 
creation of a joint venture. However, the very nature of their survey operations-mothership  based, 
limited to a single currency (yen), and fully integrated-precluded  investment and return projections 
for such a venture. Less accurate desk projections would thus become the figures on which nego- 
tiators would rely. On 5 July 1972 Taiyo submitted a comprehensive "Proposal for Participation in 
the Development of the Fishing Industry." 
Taiyo was then more than the world's largest fishing company. Since the war it had pursued an 
aggressive policy of diversification that had brought 72 subsidiaries under its roof. These embraced 
shipping, shipbuilding, cold storage, livestock production, oil and sugar  refining, marketing, banking 
and telecommunications-in  short, a  throughly integrated structure whose nucleus was  fishing. Aware 
that unclaimed fishing grounds belonged to  an earlier era,  Taiyo had already made joint ventures 
from India to Argentina. Its intent in  the Solomons was to secure as much fish as  possible to process 
'until  1976, the Australian dollar was the domestic currency of the Solornons; and until May 1979, the Solomons dollar was 
pegged to the Australian dollar on a one-toane basis. A$1 .OO  = US$O.90  (1980) and market for the EEC and Asian outlets, to  feed its  own industries (e.g.,  livestock), and to maintain 
its supply obligations to customers, such as  Van Camp Sea  Food Inc. 
In negotiations, Taiyo executives weigh concessions to  the Solomons against the overall gains 
for the transnational company. These gains may include profits from processing and marketing, savings 
on overhead to subsidiary industries, maximizing the use of capital equipment (especially that no 
longer suitable to Japan),  shutting off access to rival companies, the development of commercial 
channels to permit the marketing of products unrelated to fishing (e.g.,  sugar), and tax concessions 
(Tugendhat 1972). Rarely, however, can outsiders determine the substance of these less visible gains 
and, thus, the true dimensions of Taiyo's negotiating position. 
By contrast, the aims and objectives of the Solomon Islands Government were evident: the imme- 
diate generation of revenue, training and employment of its national labor force, and export earnings. 
The realization of these objectives was  made more urgent by a fall in the price of copra,  a mainstay 
of the economy. To compensate for its lack of expertise in fisheries affairs, SIG assembled fishing 
experts from FAO,  Rome and hired a chief fisheries officer with a commercial background to assist 
in the negotiations. The Fisheries Department became the government agency that set policies for 
managing and monitoring  the joint venture. 
Prior to the formal negotiations the SIG notified Taiyo that: 
a 25% "free ride" on joint venture shares,  and 
a 10% export duty on frozen fish 
were non-negotiable. For its part, Taiyo came to the bargaining table with proposals geared to  estab- 
lishing a regional base for its distant-water fishing fleet. Taiyo pressed for the following: 
pioneer status for the new company to cut its  tax burden during the developing years 
the charterage rather than purchase of catcher boats to avoid large capital outlays 
exclusive rights to buy and market the products of the joint company 
priority rights for the mother company's  own vessels within Solomon Islands waters 
free land on which the shorebase would be built 
5% commission on all canned and frozen fish marketed by Taiyo. 
Note that government priorities  centered on fiscal issues rather than the social conditions  under which 
nationals would work. During the discussions, labor relations were only touched upon. 
The joint venture talksshed the secrecy of the first agreement and drew in relevant SIG officials 
from the departments of Natural Resources,  Lands, Safety, Marine, Customs, Taxation and Labor. 
To solicit local support for the impending venture, a point was  made of keeping local politicians 
informed. The negotiations presented not only a clash of interests, but of styles, arising from cultural 
differences. 
Taiyo and the SIG hammered out a compromise agreement which centered mainly on monetary 
issues. The government position was that the 10% duty and the 25% equity were the price Taiyo 
would have to pay for preferential access to the country's resources. Taiyo bargained  intensely to 
obtain their priority objective: a base facility to service company vessels fishing in the southwest 
Pacific. Throughout the negotiations, Taiyo unsuccessfully moved to introduce a provision for 
housing its  entire southwest Pacific fleet. 
The SIG wassuccessful in obtaining, at  no expense,  25% equity in the joint company. However, 
two provisions diluted the value of their holdings: one limited the initial authorization of capital to 
50% and the other set a steep loan/equity ratio of 6: 1. Taiyo conceded the lo%  export duty on 
frozen fish, although a concessionary rate for the first three years tempered its effect. The joint com- 
pany was  granted exclusive rights to Solomon waters for ten years,  thus assuring Taiyo a supply of 
fish for the near future. The parent company was ceded sole foreign marketing rights for the products 
of the joint venture, and a commission of 5% on canned tuna and 3% on frozen fish. At least in the 
early years, chartered Okinawan boats would be the mainstay of the STL fleet, even though they con- 
stituted the largest operational expense. Other ancillary provisions reduced taxes on Taiyo, provided 
for a free shorebase, and outlined operations. As  neither Taiyo nor the Solomons wanted to depend on STL profits to realize their incomes, 
both took their rewards through other channels (e.g.,  export duty, interest on loans, transshipment 
charges). As a result, the financial projections  showed that STL would be marginally profitable (Allan, 
Charlesworth and Co. 1977), a point that would become telling in any recession in skipjack prices 
orsignificant jump in operatingexpenses.  Indirect profit-taking of this magnitude generates unstable 
financial conditions, especially in the high-risk business of fishing. Thus in 1976, its  best year, STL 
registered profits in the thousands, and in 1978, its  worst year, suffered losses in the millions. The 
significant point is that STL is most akin to  a cross between a licensinglmanaging agreement and a 
subsidiary company. 
The joint venture agreement was signed into effect on 4 November 1972 and by March of the 
following year operations had begun. For the Solomons the emphasis and tone of the document 
represented a decision to  establish primary industries before developing human resources. Issues of 
manpower training, baitfish negotiations, provision of housing, social and medical facilities, safety, 
conditions of employment, and public relations were mentioned only in general terms. No clear-cut 
objectives or schedules-other  than the percentage of nationals to be employed-were  set.  Indeed, 
STL agreed no more than to "use  its best endeavours"  to  attain reasonable progress. The absence of 
guidelines also reduced the power of government officials to enforce health and safety standards; and 
in practice they have little sway over STL operations. Moreover, that the company ledger would 
always show minimal profits, even in the best years,  means that an investment in training or medical 
programscan always be judged too costly-for  example, housing at  the Tulagi base  is inadequate but 
STL reports that it does not have the funds to cover new construction. 
In March 1973, Solomon-Taiyo landed its first skipjack under the terms of the joint venture 
agreement. By late August, the first shorebase opened at  Tulagi. Its facilities included a cold store of 
600-t capacity, ice plants of 25-t capacity, and a brine freezer of 45-t capacity. By October a cannery 
commenced modest production of 600 cases per day. Before the end of the year, an "arabushi" 
smoked fish factory complimented the cannery. 
In January 1976, the second shorebase opened at Noro, with slightly larger and more modern 
facilities. STL sells frozen fish in bulk to overseas canneries, mainly Van Camp, which has had a 
longstanding supply agreement with Taiyo. The joint venture markets its canned skipjack through 
Taiyo to  the EEC,  and in small amounts to Japan. The dark meat that is judged not suitable for 
export is distributed locally under the "Solomon Blue"  label. 
In  its  fishing operations, Solomon-Taiyo performed  creditably for a young company. Its  catcher 
contingent averaged in the neighborhood of 3 tldaylboat and total catch advanced towards 18,000 t 
per annum in 1978. However, the annual catch has fluctuated erratically. Table 1 illustrates the 
Table 1. Skipjack catch and utilizationa (in tonnes). 
Total  Change from  Frozen1 
Year  catch  previous year  % Change  exported  % Frozen  Canned  % Canned  Smoked  % Smoked 
aTonnage figures for catch and utilization are from the Solomon Islands 1979  Statistical Yearbook,  page 82. 
b~igures  for 1977 are estimates. fluctuations in total catch and in the distribution of sales. Note that landings have see-sawed greatly, 
the only discernible trend being a decrease in the percentage of change. Note also that frozen fish 
account for upwards of 70% of the exports. 
The joint company netted a slight overall profit, returns generally hovering near the break-even 
point. By direct and indirect taxation (e.g.,  import duties on Japanese luxuries or the withholding 
tax on interest, the SIG extracted revenues which favorably tilted their balance of payments and cash 
flow.  Local employment skyrocketed and STL has  become a cardinal source of unskilled jobs. 
The growth of the joint company saw the ascendance of the Fisheries Department. It  evolved 
from a minor limb of the Agriculture Department into a virtually autonomous agency within the 
Natural Resources Ministry. The brief of the Fisheries Department was  bifocal: one division was to 
develop small-scale fisheries and the other to manage the government's interest in the joint venture. 
As  the department evolved, management became its primary objective and strongest arm. It became 
the Government center on all matters involving the joint venture, from tuna quotas and pricing 
schedules to surveillance and labor relations. Concordantly, the money and personnel allocated to 
Fisheries expanded rapidly. 
The Fisheries Department aimed to ensure that Taiyo and SIG abided by the spirit of the con- 
tract and that STL continued to produce revenues. For example, the verification of landing prices 
became a constant duty because there was no simple means of determining rates. By virtue of the 
Fisheries Department's specialized functions, STL's pivotal position in  the economy,  Islanders' sen- 
sitivity to  outsiders fishing their waters, and the personalities of key people, strictly fisheries matters 
became meshed with political ones. Decisions could no longer be made on the basis of biological or 
economic merit alone. 
During infancy, the joint venture suffered from communications and cultural barriers leading 
to pitched fights between Okinawans and Solomon Islanders aboard the catcher boats. STL workers 
were further uninspired by sub-standard  housing, health and safety conditions. Outside the STL shore- 
base,  catcher boat crews baited village morals by chasing women,  encouraging prostitution, and 
"stealing"  baitfish. The urgency in the making of the joint venture forced the government to entrust 
management to  the Fisheries Department before that Department had time to  become fully organized 
to deal with these ensuing problems. 
POLITICS OF BAITFISHING 
Baitfishing  is an electric issue, being the political point at which the government, commercial 
fishing interests, and artisanal fishing directly conflict. Interestingly, the Solomon Islands govern- 
ment does not officially recognize the claims of reef ownership. Notwithstanding, Solomon-Taiyo 
Limited pays compensation to reef owners in the person of chiefs or big-men. Neither the govern- 
ment nor Solomon-Taiyo balks at compensation, even though this constitutes  a strong form of recog- 
nition of ownership. This is due both to the unwillingness to challenge custom and to the low price 
of baitfish. Up until March 1980, the joint venture paid only $3 per boat per night for as  much bait 
as  they could take. This is considerably less than the $15 per bucket paid in  Japan (Matsuo 1973) 
and $20 per bucket in Hawaii (Hester 1975). After a new agreement was  negotiated in early 1980, 
the price of baitfish rose four-fold, although even the new levels are comparatively low. 
Many villagers believe commercial bait and tuna fishing have diminished their canoe catches. 
A few communities have refused to rent their reefs to bait fishermen on the grounds that the loss 
of baitfish deprives them not only of tuna, which come inshore to feed on the bait, but also the 
rainbow runner, kingfish, and other species that associate with the skipjack. In  Ontong Java,  where 
fish and coconuts are the staples, and at least one New Georgian village,  leaders have denied access 
to bait fishermen. They feel they are experiencing excellent fishing as  a result. 
Both the Fisheries Department and Solomon-Taiyo are anxious to quell village fears and to 
instill the idea that failure to cooperate with baitfishing interests jeopardizes national development. Certainly the foreign exchange and employment generated by pole-and-line  fishing would suffer 
without a reliable baitfishery. 
Although active fishermen in the community often oppose baitfishing, some villagers are only 
too happy to reap the windfall of bait royalties. Solomon-Taiyo regularly receives written requests 
about bait royalties from a variety of people, including government leaders. 
Solomon-Taiyo pays the bait royalties into the account of a few persons rather than the village 
as  a  whole, certain landowners and chiefs who they designate "trustees"  of the village account. How- 
ever, these individuals are under no legal obligation to share the royalties; money can be withdrawn 
from the account only at  their behest. Some spend only for their own person; others help build 
schools and churches; still others disburse the money widely to relatives. The common denominator 
is that all of these trustees derive a measure of political power because they control the keys to the 
community's wealth. 
One result of this payment procedure has been continuing friction within villages over the use 
and abuse of royalty monies. The problem is that the procedure takes advantage of the social order 
of the village by paying chiefs-the  custodians of the reefs; but, at the Same  time, it undermines 
order by introducing an outside source of wealth which lacks the moral and legal controls found 
within the local economy (see Salisbury 1968). 
A means of sidestepping the entire baitfishing issue is to employ the purse seine as it requires 
no parallel fishery. But, so  far, the Fisheries Department has viewed this method as economically 
and politically unsound. In terms of wage earners,  purse seining would reduce the number of offshore 
jobs.  More, it  would replace the unskilled labor of pole-and-line fishermen with high cost equipment. 
In  terms of the village, the development of a baitfishery would continually feed cash into the rural 
economy. Hence, the Central Planning Office proposed that villagers participate more actively in bait- 
fishing instead of renting reefs. This proposal has received little  support. Neither STL nor villagers 
wish to put the responsibility of daily supply of bait on the shoulders of the community. Tight bait 
schedules, essential to commercial fishing, just do not fit into the routines of Solomon Islands life. 
More to  the point, the money offered for a hard day's  fishing is barely more than the rent. Never- 
theless, the Central Planning Office feels compelled to offer the local baitfishing project as it would 
suit the aim of village cash development. Their 1980 development plan cites it as a target. 
LONGLINING AGREEMENT 
The initial 1973 joint venture agreement prohibited purse seining and longlining. It  did, how- 
ever,  anticipate these possibilities and stipulated that any new agreement be based on a separate 
feasibility study. Taiyo initiated  a long-term  Coral Sea  resourcessurvey in 1973. Global "oil shock" 
and licensing problems interrupted operations which recommenced in 1976. From Taiyo's vantage, 
the survey demonstrated the value of longlining and by March 1977 they proffered a proposal. The 
target species was yellowfin and the market the quality sashimi trade in Japan. 
SIG,  too, wished to gear  up a longlining industry under the aegis of Solomon-Taiyo. Their 
reasons were varied but consistent, with a strong emphasis on the development and protection of 
these fish stocks. Their foremost interest was  in establishing a profitable new industry that would 
contribute to the treasury. More, longlining would complement the existing pole-and-line operation 
as it focuses on the deep-swimming yellowfin, big eye and billfish rather than surface-swimming 
skipjack. It  would also maximize use of the existing capital equipment. In particular, the cannery 
could take advantage of the yellowfin season from April to November when the skipjack catches are 
slumping. An additional motive for SIG was  a desire to begin to gain a measure of control over the 
Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean longliners which had for many years been fishing the Solomon 
Islands. 
The Taiyo proposal depicted a marginally profitable venture that would require special conces- 
sions from the Solomons if it were to be feasible. Essentially, the Solomons was to become a port of 
call for the longliners based in Japan and flying Japanese colors; the crew, with the exception of a few unskilled positions, were to be Japanese drawing rather high salaries; and Japanese longliners 
were to be ceded priority access over all other vessels. Other crucial decisions were to  be laid in the 
hands of STL management, the majority of whom were Taiyo men. The SIG, with FA0  advice, 
rejected the proposal. They took issue with the accuracy of Taiyo's projections which purportedly 
showed that a locally-based  operation using intermediate size boats was  unfeasible. 
The Solomons and Taiyo conducted negotiations in Honiara for several days in March 1977. 
But Taiyo's  representatives, who were not the top of the line executives, were unauthorized to 
deviate from the original proposal. Discussions quickly ground to a standstill. 
The Taiyo negotiators could only read the government's position, but not create their own. 
They flew back to  Tokyo without giving notice of intent to reassess their stance and return a better 
offer. To increase the ante the SIG contemplated taking the longlining proposal to Starkist, already 
in neighboring New Guinea. Effective, this ploy would surface again as  Starkist would like to  gain 
access to Solomons resources. 
The proposal was debated several times before an agreement was  initialed. There was to be a 
two-year pilot project using two large and two intermediate-class longliners. They were to fish 
almost exclusively for the sashimi market, for although sales to a cannery demanded lower capital 
outlay and overhead on freezers and handling the profits were not enticing. Hence the larger and 
smaller vessels bearing elaborate -60"  F freezers were to work in tandem, the small boat transfer- 
ing its catch to the large one for transshipment to  Japan.  Royalty rates were set at $1,000  a month 
per vessel for the larger longliners and $500 for the smaller ones. Taiyo was granted exclusive access 
within the Slot and 12-mile limit. As  a further concession neither import nor export duties were 
imposed and all profits were for Taiyo's account, the joint venture receiving a management fee.  At 
the conclusion of the trial period STL had the option of buying from two to four longliners for its 
own operations. 
The longline agreement stipulated that any catch would not be counted against the 30,000  t 
quota set for skipjack, as  the target species was yellowfin. Other companies and countries have since 
petitioned for and purchased licenses covering the area between 12 and 200 miles. In 1979, the 
Minister of Natural Resources reported that as  many as two dozen Japanese longliners and pole boats 
were paying $350,000  against the annual catch of 6,000 t of skipjack and 2,000 t of other tunas 
(Parliamentary Debate on 28 May). In addition, Taiwanese boats have bought a license to longline 
out of the coldstore base in Santo, Vanuatu (New Hebrides). Some of the longliners, unfortunately, 
fish in the vicinity of the traditional bonito (skipjack) hunters of the Southeast Solomons,  on 
Makira. Local hunters now assume that the longliners take their skipjack; and they thus resent their 
presence. There is a recurring theme of Islanders misunderstanding the nature of industrial fishing 
and the Fisheries Department doing a poor job of public education. 
1978-1979 RENEGOTIATIONS 
In the 1978 season Solomon-Taiyo incurred a substantial loss of nearly 4 million dollars. The 
ostensible reasons for the financial fall were: 
-  poor catches in the first five months of the year when landing prices for skipjack were high, 
followed by good catches when the prices fell due to  a world over-supply 
-  expenditures for Okinawan charterage, interest on Taiyo loans, capital equipment, etc.,  were 
all paid in yen while the sales of skipjack were in dollars; as the yen appreciated against the 
dollar, STL was  caught in a currency squeeze. 
Although the Fisheries Department was cognizant of the charterage rates and the depressed catches 
it was caught by surprise when the STL management informed it of the huge deficit. 
SIG then requested a meeting to negotiate remedial measures,  including recapitalization. The 
two principals met in November 1978. Both stressed that all parties concerned with the joint venture 
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mendations submitted by the Solomons, accepted as its contribution: 
-  reduction of the charterage costs negotiated in February 1978 with Okinawan boat owners 
-  waiver of their Arabushi Technical Advisory Fee for 3 months 
-  reduction in the interest rate charged to STL from 9.84% to about 6.5% 
-  increased effort to obtain the best price for STL exports, especially frozen fish. 
The last two points deserve special attention as they strike at  the heart of the relationship 
between Taiyo and the Solomons. Taiyo's  interest charges on the 5 million dollar loan to STL were 
higher than that which the joint company could have negotiated through either independent financ- 
ing or a development bank. Taiyo's concession to step-up efforts to locate the premium price for 
STL exports makes it clear that this was  not done as  a matter of routine. The 1978 landing price 
figures,  supplied by the Japan Fisheries Agency (JFA) support this assumption. Below (Table 2) are 
the 1978 ex-vessel prices for frozen skipjack, representing the combined average of 66 ports in 
Japan (Japan Fisheries Agency 1979). 
The JFA, furthermore, reported only slightly lower prices at canneries in American Samoa 
where Taiyo markets most of STL's tuna to Van Camp. Yet, Taiyo received markedly less for STL 
tuna than the average American Samoa price. The Solomons Ministry of Finance noted that STL 
often obtained $500/t and in December 1978 had to dump 2,000 t for as  low as  $300/t. Note also 
that the Japanese figures show a decline in the second half of 1978 of only approximately 12%. 
For transnationals, pricing is a complex business which can never be reduced to any one line 
of e~change.~  Taiyo was  not necessarily interested in soliciting the best price for STLrs fish, even if 
settling fora lower price reduced its commission. Taiyo was willing to  give a  discounted price on 
frozen fish to  its fisheries partner, Van Camp, for other concessions (e.g.,  loan assistance, and market- 
ing or distribution rights). Of course,whilesuch deals may maximize overall return on the sale of 
fish, most of these profits did not accrue to STLrs account. There was a clear danger in Taiyo being 
the sole marketer of STL fish, a formidable conflict of interest that Taiyo's shareholding in STL or 
Table 2. Average monthly landing prices for skipjack tuna in Japan, 1978. 
Landings in  Price 
Month  tonnes  M$/t 
January  7,600  946 
February  11.616  937 
March  25,338  900 
April  25,500  918 
May  12,749  81 5 
June  6,127  699 
July  12,865  699 
August  9,085  884 
September  12.681  852 
October  15,795  847 
November  14,470  773 
December  19,425  800 
'when  dealing with American tuna processon there is a further complication. The U.S.A. landing price bean little relationship 
to the net economic value of the tuna because the price is set by agreement and not by the market itself. Prices derive from special 
share arrangements between captains, processors and crew (King 1978). commissions on frozen fish cannot overcome. Governments cannot expect transnationals to curb 
this standard behavior without introducing incentives, especially competitive marketing (c.f. Ozawa 
1  979). 
In the negotiations of November 1978, Taiyo also urged that the joint venture improve its 
operations and financial structure by: 
-  increasing the issuance of share capital by one million dollars 
-  increasing the equity holding of the SIG from 25% to 49% 
-  increasing the wholesale price of locally-sold  canned fish and persuading retailers to absorb 
the difference 
-  rescinding the 5% dividend proposed far STL accounts for 1977 
-  amending depreciation schedules to reduce the taxable base. 
Taiyo argued that the SIG should assist STL by extending  special tax concessions on the export 
duty and withholding tax, and by permitting the use of purse seiners to boost catches. Taiyo also 
expressed reservations about NFD, specifically that competition between N  FD and STL would under- 
mine the operations of the joint company. Negotiations broke down when SIG refused to give a 
reduction in taxes; Taiyo felt the government position was  inconsistent with the spirit of the joint 
venture agreement. 
The major stumbling blocks were: 
-  SIG desired another seat on the STL Board of Directors to give it parity with Taiyo, since its 
purchase of an additional 24% equity brought government holdings to 49% 
-  the SIG tender to purchase the additional shares at the nominal sum of 10 cents per share, 
since under the joint venture terms, the net asset value, then negative, determined the cost 
of purchase. 
Stock acquisition based on net asset value was  a crucial safeguard for the SIG, especially in 
these early years when it was  learning the ropes of fishing with a transnationaL4 These terms helped 
insure that Taiyo managers would not conspire with the mother company to manipulate a loss of 
great magnitude. In this event,  the government could claim additional 24% equity at no cost. 
It quickly became apparent that the SIG proposition to  augment its  equity at nominal cost to 
obtain parity was unacceptable.Taiyo proposed to dissolve STL on the grounds that such terms were 
both unfair and unprofitable. Inasmuch as  this threat embodies elements of Japanese culture and 
business strategy it is worth reviewing. 
Taiyo argued that in Japanese business practice the details of a written contract were  less essen- 
tial than maintaining its  spirit. An ethos of fairness and moral commitment must guide the partner- 
ship. Had not Taiyo negotiated a reduction in 1978 charterage rates with Okinawans by appealing to 
this principle? Hence, though charterage fees were legally set, the Okinawans bent to the reality of 
falling American fish prices and yen appreciation. Taiyo pointed out that STL was only one of the 
nearly 80 subsidiaries and a score of joint ventures worldwide. 
Negotiations recommenced at  Taiyors Tokyo headquarters in March 1979, when SIG decided 
to buy the additional shares at par value ($1 per share) in exchange for a continuation of the export 
duty and parity on the Board of Directors, now redefined as  3 and 3.5 Taiyo, citing charterage and 
4~n  accountant cannot detect many deliberate cost overruns simply because they turn on operating decisions. For example, a 
manager can consistently increase rental fees on refrigeration ships belonging to the mother company by calling for them before the 
catch is ready to be loaded. This ploy is especially attractive if the ships are currently inactive. To  an accountant such fees would 
appear as  constant, nondiscretionary overhead, particularly as  he possesses neither the data nor the ability to evaluate the merits of 
operational decisions, however, costly such "decisions"  may prove. 
5~lthough  the addition gave the government another vote, parity remained elusive because the agreement harbored the pro- 
visos that the Chairman of the Board then had a casting vote and that the majority shareholder appointed the Chair. In effect, a 3:2 
Taiyo majority was simply elevated to a 4:3  majority. marketing services it had rendered to STL,  pushed for a 2% boost in sales commissions on frozen 
fish. This was  amended to a management services contract and a revised marketing and distribution 
agreement. 
In the interim, SIG soughtthe necessary information  to redraft the marketing and management 
contracts. Information they requested from STL only trickled in because STLrs  Japanese manage- 
ment could not release the data until it had consulted the Tokyo hierarchy. Taiyors management, 
in Japanese fashion, had to approve every detail by consensus.  Note that STL seemed to possess a 
divided identity. When borrowing  from or marketing through Taiyo, STL was  an  independent com- 
pany enjoying  no special privileges. In  its  operations and inner management, however, STL had no 
independent voice insofar as Taiyo's own executives staff the head office and fishing bases. Overall, 
SIG complained that STL paid standard rates for Taiyo's services even  as Taiyo's  management 
decided how STL would spend  its operating funds. Accordingly, SIG,  had to operate a parallel 
organization to monitor Taiyo if it wished to leave STL management in Taiyo's hands. The joint 
venture, in effect, had a bilateral economic structure. On one side,  Taiyo rented the Solomons' 
skipjack and baitfish resources for the price of export duty and other taxes. On the other side, the 
SIG accepted the liabilities of partnership (i.e.,  recapitalization) in return for access to information 
and a voice in STLrs social policy (e.g.,  hiring of nationals). 
In summary, the negotiations produced the following results: 
-  SIG finalized its purchase of an  additional 24% of STL shares from Taiyo for S1$240,000 
-  a further 1 million shares at  $1 were issued, Taiyo buying in at $510,000  and the SIG at 
$490,000 
-  SIG gained a third Board Director but no greater control over the vote 
-  Taiyo received a technical services agreement which paid 2% of sales for recurrent services 
(e.g.,  charterage of Okinawan boats) and 3% of sale price for procurement of one-off items 
-  a revised marketing and distribution agreement which maintained the former commission 
levels. 
Ethnicity and the Expatriates of Solomon-Taiyo 
THE MANY DIVISIONS OF INTEREST 
The Solornons owns 49% and Taiyo 51% of STL until a new agreement (Second Joint Venture, 
p. 55) takeseffect in 1983. The division of equity is also a division of interests in  the most fundamen- 
tal senseland  it is an axiom of corporate management that divisive interests, leadership and personal- 
ities lead to internal warring and poor performance (Rosow 1974). 
Taiyo, as  a private Japanese corporation, presents a single face. The government, by contrast, is 
democratic in principle and thus cannot help but present a variegated front. The various Depart- 
mentsand executives may not only have conflicting interests but may vie for power by playing upon 
these conflicts. Also, the opposition party defines itself in contrast to the views of those in power 
and adds to Solomons disunity. Finally, Parliament members may distrust transnationals in general 
or have constituehts who dislike or support STL activities (Lewis 1966). 
THE STRUCTURE OF DIVISION 
Within STL, face-to-face interaction is the dominant mode of everyday communication. Face 
to face,  the slogan speaks,  is the "Pacific Way."  The implication is that telephones and telex, letters 
and memos,  imply emotional as well as  geographical distance; that animated conversation is the 
exemplary means of communication; and that the social universe is a small community where people 
know othersr emotional make-up and intentions. 
Face-to-face  interaction reveals emotions more fully than other forms of communication. Where 
words speak of ideas and objects, tone and volume of voice, inflexion and intonation, gestures and 
postures, convey emotions. Rage,  fear, loneliness, happiness and shame  all belong to paralinguistics. They are under less conscious control than words chosen carefully, often slipping through the social 
censor  to reveal  inner feelings. Indeed, many expatriates have,  and find it hard to hide,  racial 
contempt for Islanders and each other. Islanders, in turn, harbor resentment and hostility which 
they express in sulking and insubordination. People unconsciously expect to unravel the emotional 
code, dependably and fluidly. But the Japanese,  Okinawans,  Islanders and expatriates all have 
slightly different rules for emotional display, and this complicates their face-to-face interactions. 
Japanese may sink behind extreme politeness and generous smiles during a time of rising frustration 
and anger. Solomon Islanders, to the bane of Europeans, find it hostile, rude, and impolite to look 
an interlocutor in the eyes. A further complication is that a single speech behavior can emit simul- 
taneous, often contradictory, emotions. The words can be a simple request to offload a boat, but 
the tone of voice can be laden with curt authority, the smile ambiguously friendly. To begin under- 
standing this interface between personnel one must understand STL's divergent character standpoints. 
For Taiyo, STL is primarily a business enterprise in uncertain waters,  as Taiyo and SIG must 
negotiate differences in business outlook, culture and national interests. 
For the executives who run the government, STL is  a main source of Islands revenue and a 
bellwether of economic development. STL is also an industrial octopus with numerous arms that 
demand a degree of expertise and sophistication that the SIG finds imposing. This stems,  in part, 
from the rapidity of recent economic development; many government posts are not well-defined 
and some employees have very  little formal academic or technical training. 
Many of the national elite have a political stake in opposing transnationals and have directed 
considerable verbal fire at  what they feel is the exploitation of the Pacific by first-world business. 
The following account describes the ethnicity of the various nationals involved and its  effect 
on STL operations. 
JAPANESE MANAGERS 
Japanese brought in from Taiyo, Tokyo, hold exclusively the executive positions of power 
and policy  making. They fill a handful of major executive posts led by the General Manager, Base 
Managers for Tulagi and Noro, Cannery Manager for Tulagi, and several Assistant Managers. The 
managers are all hierarchically ranked on the basis of seniority, education and family connections 
into six grades. Taiyo rotates the subordinate managers about every four years. The senior men have 
spent years moving between overseas bases,  from west Africa to Alaska, captaining fishing convoys, 
and supervising giant floating factory ships.  Junior officers,  recruited from prestigious fisheries 
bniversities, are dispatched to  these foreign operations as  part of their initial 5 to 10 years training. 
Some are destined to  a life abroad, others will return to Taiyo offices in  Japan (Ozawa 1979). The 
General Manager has responsibility for the operations and financial progress of STL and for deter- 
mining policy. In concert with the other Taiyo managers at STL, he makes decisions on fishing 
operations, cannery production, capital construction, and social services offered to national workers. 
He sits on the Board of Directors of NFD and STL, being chairman of the latter. On major decisions, 
however, he must consult the Tokyo head office; thus there is a constant flow of information about 
STL to senior executives in Tokyo (c.f. Rohlen 1974). 
With one exception, the Japanese  managers live in separation from their families for the 
duration of their overseas work (Nakane 1970). 
To offset cultural and familial separations, company associates form close allegiances. Even in 
Japan,  business' demanding social obligations isolate Japanese men from their homelife. There is a 
disjuncture between home and office which excludes wives from business entertaining; husbands 
consider it unmanly to tell wives about business affairs. Men index their loyalty and fidelity to 
company through hard work, and indeed achieve self-realization through service to company (De 
Vos  1973). A common system of values-loyalty,  intimacy, identity-links  the corporation and 
family, the two social and imbricated universes within which men move. This allows close ties to 
business associates to compensate for familial distance created by business schedules and policies. While this togetherness sublimates the pain of cultural distance it also prevents the Taiyo men 
from forming friendships with local people, from empathizing with their problems and needs,  and 
from understanding local motives regarding work and pay. In essence,  the Japanese cultural system 
functions as  a distancing mechanism in foreign settings. 
The total association between Taiyo and its personnel materializes in  the history and operations 
of STL. Although the Japanese managers are the executives of STL, charged with developing the 
joint company, in fact their future, loyalties, and cultural instincts lie with Taiyo. Insofar as  Taiyo 
and the SIG have competing objectives and rewards this poses a problem for the Government. Thus, 
the oft heard SIG complaint that the joint company has  no separate identity from its parent. 
This commitment to group loyalty and harmony by STL managers contrasts with Solomon 
Islands labor practices which are founded on a different culture and history. National workers frustrate 
Japanese expectations and STL managers are thus appalled by what they see as the Solomon Islandersr 
casual commitment to  work, disregard for authority, and lack of fidelity to the company. By Japa- 
nese standards this is an accurate appraisal. Of course, for the Islander, wage  labor is but one cog of 
a largereconomic framework devolving on the village, wherein lies his locus of loyalty and devotion: 
gardening, fishing, producing copra, and doing whatever else he must to assist the clan and extended- 
family enterprise. These people guarantee his social prosperity and protection  as,  in an analogous 
manner, the Taiyo company guarantees them to its  Japanese workers. 
The social practice of temporary wage  labor migration is ingrained as  part of an  historical 
pattern perpetuated by wages so  low that men find it impossible to support and house their families. 
Ironically, STL continues this tradition of a  subsistence wage which forms the backbone of transience. 
Village lifestyle is both foreign and invisible to  the Japanese sequestered on bases and in town, as  is 
the tradition of transient labor they unwittingly reinforce. 
Taiyo's managers,  like many others from literate cultures, imagine the village as  "primitive", 
not only technologically but socially. This justifies crowded housing and a monotonous mess hall 
diet because these are viewed as no less hospitable than the conditions into which the workers were 
born. Further, inasmuch as nationals are not going to remain long in the company, there is no point 
in training them or expending money or effort to improve their talents, the social climate or social 
services. 
From the Japanese ethic, the lslanders are incapable of becoming members of the company, of 
identifying with Taiyo and achieving self-realization through work. Their spare time is rife with 
drinking and fighting that undermines company harmony. They shelter wontoks who seem to settle 
in for extended stays on the base,  sneaking them food from the company mess. The Solomonrs idea 
that loyalty lies in "kinship",  and nowhere else, runs entirely counter to Japanese belief. 
The Japanese also find the cultural differences which affect the flow of interaction between 
people difficult to fathom. Where the Japanese are basically a homogeneous group with a strong 
heritage of internal rank and hierarchy (Benedict 1946), Solomon lslanders are heterogeneous in the 
extreme with a long tradition of relatively egalitarian systems. The Japanese find it hard to concep- 
tualize relationships outside those of senior and junior, especially when they coincide with different 
ranks within the company. As  a result, the Solomon lslanders appear recalcitrant, insubordinate, 
defying higher authority in a manner explicable only by reference to their "uncivilized"  cultures. 
Again this strikes at  the heart of the relationship between nationals and Japanese.  It also inspires the 
managers who feel somewhat threatened by this egalitarian behavior, to act superior and imperious, 
a behavior pattern that lslanders scorn and ridicule in private. Indeed, joking expresses and diffuses 
their anger towards the Japanese. 
In effect, the cultural circumstances of STL have established a circle that impedes the develop 
ment of human resources as well as  industrialization. It  is important to  see that this circle is not 
orchestrated. Rather it  is  the interlocking of two social patterns whose gears are set so  differently 
that friction is inevitable. OKINAWAN FISHERMEN 
Okinawans now, and in the foreseeable future, constitute an important  force in STL operations. 
They are captains and crew on all the catcher boats in a ratio of approximately 10 to 13 with 
Islander deckhands (actual numbers proportional to the number, size, and ownership of the boats 
fishing). The proportion of STLrs  fleet directly chartered from Okinawan owners is decreasing as 
the joint venture acquires its own vessels. 
As  boat owners in need of finance and fishing masters who command the charter crew, Okina- 
wans interface with Japanese management. As  fishing masters and boat crew they spend repetitive 
two- to threeday periods at  sea,  often putting into base for but an hour to exchange the fish for 
fresh supplies of ice, fuel, and food (Kuchikura 1975). On board they thus interact intensively with 
the Islander crew, a situation which heightens the potential for both strong bonding and violence. 
Accordingly,  the personalities involved have great bearing on the tenor of Islander-Okinawan 
relations. 
For historical reasonsstill unclear, almost all of the catcher boat owners and Okinawan skipjack 
fishermen are Sarahama people coming from a small clutch of islands-Miyaka,  Irabu, and Ikema-in 
southern Okinawan waters. Their language and culture are distinct from the neighboring Okinawan 
groups on Okinawa Island, the seat of government and the center of US military occupation until 
1974. Both  skipjack fishing and baitfishing are part of their technical mastery, which sets them apart 
from other Okinawansand makes them adaptable to the conditions  of southern-seas skipjack fishing. 
Since before the war when they were active in Borneo, Philippines, Taiwan, and in the Micro- 
nesian seas  of Palau, Truk, and Ponape,  Sarahama fishermen have been year-round journeymen of 
the southern waters. One estimate (Kato, personal communication) is that 80% to 90% of the male 
population were abroad fishing or running a large processing plant on Palau. The war suspended 
fishing and exiled the Sarahama from their favorite overseas fishing grounds. After the war,  the major 
fishing companies began to enter the area.  For Taiyo, the Sarahama people, live-bait skipjack 'fish- 
ermen by tradition, at  home in the southern tuna seas,  willing to endure long stints away from home, 
and to  work for a modest wage, were the natural  choice. The Sarahama tradition of chartered catcher 
boats and/or crew flowered rapidly starting in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s many US and Japa- 
nese companies were competing for Sarahama boats, charterage rates rose dramatically, and new 
entrepreneurs were eager to borrow money to invest in catchers. With just several exceptions, how- 
ever,  these new owners had a strong fishing history. 
Although rich in fishing skills and relatives who could be recruited, Okinawans, with only a 
few exceptions, had insufficient family collateral to  secure financing for a catcher boat. Thus each 
potential boat owner, or senshoo, forged an agreement with a fishing company-Starkist,  Taiyo, 
Kaigai, to name the most important-who  would capitalize a modest second-hand wooden catcher 
in exchange for purchase rights on the tuna netted. The companies extended long-term loans, 
looking as ardently at the owners' fishing experience as at their financial position, and this estab- 
lished the borrowing structure for the Okinawan fishing industry. Indebtedness currently runs as 
high as one million dollars for a senshoo.  For the companies, the indebtedness of senshoos afforded 
management sufficient control over production to make long-term commitments such as  a joint 
venture. 
At first the small number of overseas boats meant that Sarahama crews were readily available 
and wages  modest, both in relative and absolute terms. But, as in prewar days, they proved to be 
excellent tuna fishermen, the kin-structured boats operating with a high level of incentive, coordina- 
tion, harmony, and skills. Soon Starkist, Taiyo, Kaigai, and Kyokuyo, all wishing to expand opera- 
tions in the Solomons and Papua New Guinea, were competing heavily for the Sarahama catchers 
and crews. The number of boats escalated quickly; and the companies made concerted efforts to 
attract the best boats and crews. Good crews thus became more valuable and this drove up wages 
even faster than inflation. The owners mediate between the transnationals and crews,  as they are 
tied into both groups by a web of social and financial obligations. Hence in their struggle to win the best boats manned by the keenest and best equipped crews the companies turn the competition 
over to the senshoo. He attracts crewmen through his network of kinship and business ties that 
penetrate the fishing community. Owners know that they exist by virtue of their connections rather 
than just money. Indeed, no company or individual, no matter how rich, could expect to hire a 
first-rate crew-one  that was  loyal, successful, and trustworthy-unless  they had social ties. 
The Sarahama practice is also to recruit deckhands and other crew from their kinsmen. While 
this approach may not always enlist the best seamen from a technical standpoint, compelling social 
and economic advantages outweigh calculation based purely on individual skills. The conditions of 
skipjack fishing-long  periods in close quarters, swells of intense activity which disrupt the rhythm 
of eating and sleeping, danger of bad weather and flying hooks-magnify  these advantages. 
Since the advent of the joint company, the interaction between the Okinawans and Solomon 
Islanders, especially those from Malaita, has  been both a point of government concern and an 
illustration of social accommodation. The flow of events divides the first decade into two phases: 
an  initial period of conflict and work adjustment lasting roughly five years,  followed by a gradually 
building accord still marred by occasional flare-ups. 
Before experience and time bridged their differences, lslanders and Okinawans only communi- 
cated by gestures, even in  tense working situations, as  when the catcher came upon a skipjack school. 
As  both sides were condemned to  non-verbal communication, little training of lslanders was  possible. 
In addition, the Safety Inspector with the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor found that the 
language barrier was the foremost safety hazard. 
For their part, Islanders, through a blend of fact and fancy, fear the Okinawans. One current 
myth is that Okinawans, and indeed all Orientals, are black belts in the martial arts, endowed with 
the karate powers of Bruce Lee whose movies of violence and revenge are enormously popular in 
the Solomons because they appeal to the tradition of pay-back warfare. 
While fearscontribute  to conflict the most frequent and immediate cause  is work schedule.  Fish- 
ing boats, whether off Tulagi or New York City, must fish intensively to turn a profit. Such regime 
runs counter to the Solomon Islands work pattern which seeks to combine production activities 
with leisurely social intercourse. Insults are universally cast and fights precipitated on the best of 
boats over the compulsive drive of Okinawans to fish around the clock, baitfishing by night and 
tuna fishing by day to  turn the greatest profit. The temptation is for Okinawans to perceive lslanders 
as innately lazy and for lslanders to see  Okinawans as irrationally greedy. After more than a decade 
of contact, the stereotypes persist. 
For the Okinawans, fishing has a significant religious dimension that is instrumental in deter- 
mining success or failure. Onboard every catcher boat, in the quarters of the fishing master, there is 
a small glass-paned shrine harboring the Funadama, or boat spirit. A decade of contact has taught 
lslanders to  respect the Okinawan's religion  and to tread lightly on their ritual practices. The religious 
tolerance shown by both sides is part and product of a larger cultural accommodation that has slowly 
evolved as  the relationship between Solomon lslanders and Okinawans matured. 
Those lslanders who have not abandoned offshore work have picked up the nuances of Okina- 
wan kinship, routine, and cuisine. Certainly one of the bonuses for the lslanders crewmen is the 
variety and quality of the food on the catchers. Okinawans regularly serve chicken wings, eggs, 
canned pork, and soy sauce,  all delicacies in Solomon lslanders eyes.  More, the locals, noticing that 
Okinawans use chopsticks, eager to eliminate cultural fences and explore new terrain, asked to use 
chopsticks too. The request helped break the practice of de facto segregation at meal time and 
lslanders began to acquire Okinawan tastes and table manners. 
Some  lslanders have even learned Sarahama language. A distinctive language is part of the Sara- 
hama identity, a means used to construct and maintain the welthey division. Hence, when Solomon 
lslanders acquire the Sarahama tongue, even in an abbreviated and broken fashion, it narrows the 
cultural distance. The social and psychological value,  magnified by the microcosm of the boat, is  as 
great as the strictly communicative value. It opens the door to friendship, training, and social ex- 
change. Theeffort of lslanders to  learn Sarahama is itself an act of friendship and social commitment. money, the driving principle is the making of a social relationship. The relative social positions and 
mutual needs of exchangers, not the market, set the rate of exchange. Second, exchange is between 
social groups even when the main agents are individuals. They are representatives of their clans and, 
at least implicitly, carry out transactions in the clan's  name as  well as their own. One result is that 
for Island workers an action by a specific Japanese manager is an action of the Japanese group. 
Third, exchange is meant to initiate or underwrite social intercourse. Accordingly, work is a social 
experience, replete with all the courtesies, manners and habits reserved for sociality. Modern industry, 
however, draws an iron distinction between worktime and leisure time. STL cannot tolerate workers 
taking random breaks to gossip,  chew betel nut and tell anecdotes,  all mainstays of the village work 
regime. Fourth, there is the expectation that the exchangers will deepen their relationship and mutual 
commitment over time. So the longer a man works at  STL the more he expects STL to take an active 
interest in his welfare and that of his family. 
Solomon Islanders have adapted to this changed work environment. Conceptually, they under- 
stand plantation labor as a degenerate form of exchange, one that desocializes labor at  the expense 
of moral and effective gains. They see STL as an environment in which the Japanese suspend the 
social entailments of labor exchange. However, behavioral adjustments are never uniform as  not all 
components of behavior evolve at  the same speed. 
Another telling difference between industry and village lies in the motivation to work. In  the 
village, labor (typically gardening, fishing or crafts production) is  a primary step in attaining prestige, 
recognition, social position and security. These rewards are incentives to work; they underpin the 
entire motivational system surrounding labor. Moreover, the community's constant watch and 
evaluation of workers spurs them to work diligently on pain of losing their personal reputation. 
Contrast this with plantation or industry where there are few direct social rewards for performance. 
Industrious STL workers receive little prestige, status, or security, either from management or 
fellow employees. 
In essence,  the social bases of labor and its institutional supports have been pulled out from 
under workers. What has developed in their place is a cross between western individualism and 
Island clanship. Thus,  young men aver that it is imperative to acquire money to buy goods and 
improve their standard of living. At the same time, they cite their best reasons for wage earning as 
the need to pay taxes,  contribute to their Christian church,  finance village businesses, and pay 
school fees for relatives. So far, however, only a small amount of cash flows back to the village; 
most men,  feeling alienated and confused at  the shorebase, waste their wages on alcohol, gambling 
and disposable goods. Accordingly, there is still not sufficient incentive for men to remain on the 
job once they marry and assume the responsibilities  of manhood. 
EMPLOYMENT 
A census in July 1979 revealed that 279 STL men were employed at the Tulagi shorebase. And 
in the last three years of the joint venture, the number has fluctuated around this figure. There is a 
seasonal adjustment with more men working in the peak fishing months, May through October, 
than when the vessels are at  anchor December through February. Offshore, July 1979,96 STL men 
were employed onboard the 15 Okinawan charter boats plus about 68 crewmen on STL's  errand- 
running, mail and supply crafts. In addition, NFD's Solomon Fisher out of Tulagi hired 16 Islander 
crew members bringing the total of offshore workers to 180. The number will probably decrease in 
the near future as STL trims its labor force in favor of mechanization. 
As  noted, Noro is scheduled to switch positions with Tulagi in the second decade of the joint 
venture to become the primary shorebase with a cannery. Tulagi will revert to Noro's role as  a 
coldstore/transshipment port. In preparation, STL began trimming Tulagi's work force as  early as 
1980. Through redundancies, sackings and attrition STL aims to reduce the onshore force by 20%. JOB DESCRIPTION AND WAGE RATES 
At Tulagi, there are seven  specialized plant operations, each  under the supervision of an 
Islander foreman: Base Office, Cannery, Smoke Factory, Power House, Coldstore, Mess and Carpentry 
Shop. Then, there are the seven 9-man labor sections (A through G) each composed of a section 
leader, fork lift  driver, storekeeper and hands. Three lalbor sections work the day shift, three work 
the night shift and the seventh is off every 24 hours. The three sections on duty at any one time 
take turns handling the wharf, brine and ice operations. 
When a catcher loaded with skipjack docks at  Tulagi, the labor section working on the wharf 
swings into action to provide fuel,  ice and supplies. The wharf hands and the crew fill baskets with 
fish down in the hold and then shoulder them up to th~e  outstretched arm onshore. The fish are then 
put onto pallets. Once the storekeeper sitting by the scale records the tonnage, the fork lift  driver 
moves the pallets to the brine tanks. The boat crew loads supplies and fuel onto the boat; they also 
place future orders with the storekeeper. STL rules allow only crewmen to load the supplies to 
insure sole catcher responsibility for theft and error. 
While these operations are in progress, the ice section wheels over chipped ice on lorries to 
stash in the hold (most catchers are still ice boats). Othler catchers coming in behind layer out from 
the wharf,  sometimes impatiently shouting for their turn to offload and restock for immediate 
departure for the baitfishing grounds. Late afternoons tend to be busiest since baitfishing is done at 
night for the next day's chumming of skipjack. Well-orchestrated wharf, ice and brine teams can 
unload 10 t of skipjack and have the boat casting off irr a half-hour. Onshore speed  is important, less 
because it makes a difference in the amount of fish landed than that it assures Okinawans that 
Islanders work hard in their cause. 
The offloaded skipjack soak in brine for about 101 hours. At this point a brace of coldstore 
workers, bundled in  fur-trimmed  parkas incongrous to the tropics, mound the fish into the cavernous 
freezer.  The skipjack remain in the coldstore vault until transshipped or utilized by the Smoke 
Factory or Cannery. Since STL transships more than 75% of its  catch, there are periodic surges in 
activity when foremen assemble as  many men as  possible to load the great bulks of tuna onto vessels 
bound for American Samoa or San  Diego. 
The mess unit prepares three meals a day for almost all onshore men. The job requires little in 
the way of organization as the menu never varies. The \~orkers  eat Honiara-made packaged hardtack 
with tea for breakfast and skipjack accompanied with rice at  other meals. The sole exception is 
Saturday when the mess serves tinned meat. The mess unit is responsible for chopping the day's  fire- 
wood and preparing the skipjack. As they might in the village, the men butcher the skipjack on a 
tree stump with machetes.  If  organization poses no pralblem, policing the mess  line is a constant and 
unrewarding task. From management's standpoint, their most important job is to verify who in the 
food queue is  a worker and who is a wontok trying to freeload. Time and again STL has concocted 
schemes to distinguish workers from wontoks. Perhaps the most successful has been in hiring men 
from Gela to manage the mess as  they have the fewest wontoks. 
At STL there are three levels or grades of workers: A,  B and C,  respectively. A  represents 
unskilled labor and in 1979 constituted approximately 9%  of the nationals employed. B represents 
partlyskilled labor, mostly carpenters and mechanics, and constitutes the remaining 7% of the work 
force. C is the skilled management designation and to date no national has reached it. Wage  scales 
for the A grade are as follows (as of February 1979):~ 
three months probationary period  S1$1.12 per hour 
three months to 12 months  S1$1.23  per hour 
12 months  to 24 months  S1$1.28  per hour 
24 months to 36 months  S1$1.33  per hour Beyond the base pay there are allowances for hardship posts. Coldstore workers,  night-shift  fish 
gutters and machine workers all collect an additional 20d per day.  Overtime is time and a half and 
holiday pay is double time. Skill rather than time served determines wage rates at level B;  and on 
average they are 98%0 higher than grade A wages. 
A Solomon-wide misconception is that STL issues "free rations" to all its  employees. In fact, 
STL deducts $18 monthly for meals.  However, most workers believe they get free rations, since 
they never see nor have seen the deducted money. A few workers, generally married foremen with 
families, are granted a meal contract which pays them a food allowance to cook for themselves. But 
by 1980, STL had placed a freeze on new meal contracts, thus, inadvertently or not, discouraging 
married men from joining STL. The inyth of "free  rations" stems from the fact that the majority of 
plantation workers must "fightem  rations",  that is,  spend their wages for food. The lure of free 
food attracts wontoks to STL. They come both for employment and just to  eat,  especially as the 
mess serves bonito, traditionally a prestige food resewed for ceremony. 
RECRUITMENT TO STL 
Most workers are recruited by other workers and they do this in two main ways.  In the first, 
workers go  home on leave or meet wontoks in Honiara and convince the brother or close childhood 
friend to keep them company and taste the benefits offered by STL. They cite the adventure and 
free rations and the beer.  Emotional and personal comfort afforded by such companionship is 
significant for workers raised in tight-knit, supportive communities. In the second,  a close relative or 
friend arrives at Tulagi for a visit. During his stay, which may last anywhere from a day to several 
months, the worker finds his relative a position. The visitor, his bonds pre-established, emotional 
supports and village friends in place, has few reservations about seeking or accepting a job. 
In the third and  less frequent form of recruitment, men simply walk in off the streets of 
Honiara and approach the STL personnel management in the head office. They facefellow Islanders 
who can trace their character from the flow of information through wontok networks. Yet,  even 
when men walk in off the street it is not unusual for them to be introduced by a relative who 
already works for STL. The logic of social introduction requires the presence of intermediaries in 
some form. Thus,  recruitment at  STL follows the traditional dictate that one does not intrude upon 
another's village or business without an invitation or introduction to eliminate mistrust on both parts. 
What is different nowadays, is that the intermediary no longer has to be a close relation as  he did a 
generation ago.  More than likely, Islanders will come to consider business partners as  suitable inter- 
mediaries in the near future. 
THE 6lGRATION PATTERN OF YOUNG MEN 
In  the last 15 years,  there has emerged a characteristic pattern of migration for young men. Its 
form resembles traditional labor migration, though the implications and effects are different. 
Most youths leave school at the termination of primary education, few venturing into high 
school or college. The school-leaver finds himself at home in a village whose  lifestyle and pace 
cannot compare with the stories he hears over the airwaves or from teachers.  He  lingers about 
the village, lending a hand in family enterprises, playing soccer with other youths, and listening to 
music cassettes brought in by others. Bored by village life, unable to secure a post in the government 
bureaucracy or a position in business because of meager education, he is game for contract labor. 
Thus a wontok on leave will easily recruit him to wage earning. 
For villagers, labor migration implies that the goals of modernity have not been met, especially 
in  the realm of education. Today's youths are the first generation to receive mass education. At least 
in the very beginning, parents felt that they were exchanging school fees,  a heavy burden on their 
small cash incomes, for long-term wage earning positions in government and business for their sons. 
Education was a major departure from tradition, an unprecedented investment, and thus its failure Aspects of Fishing in the Solomon Islands 
Photographs by S.K. IMeltzoff 
1.  Sarah  Meltzoff  with  children  in  a village  on Small 
Malaita. 
2.  Porpoise  hunting at  Fanalei,  Malaita.  Hunters herd 
the porpoises into the nearby passage,  then everyone in 
the village sets  out in canoes,  clapping flints underwater 
to idrive the porpoises into a mangrove cove where they 
can1  be wrestled into the canoes. 
3.  'Traditional bonito hooks:  the one on the right of one 
piece of  pearlshell  is for trolling kehind the canoe;  the 
one  on the left, a tortoise shell hook bound to a pearl- 
shell  lure,  is for casting in front of the canoe.  Hunters 
todlay use these old hooks as well as the modern versions. 
4.  Solomon Tiaiyo Ltd. tuna base  at Tulagi.  Catchers at 
rest during the January-March hiatus when the Okinawan 
charter crews go home for a rest. 
5.  Noon at the Solomon Taiyo Ltd. base, Tulagi. Tulagi 
has  had  no  local  population since  the start of British 
col~onial  rule in the 1890s. 6 
6.  Nearby islanders come to STL to tradegarden produce 
with the crews and to see  the bigger overseas transship- 
ment vessels  coming in for the frozen skipjack. Here an 
islander passes behind catcher boats at Tulagi. 
7.  Japanese  from  Taiyo,  Tokyo,  came  to  Tulagi  to 
experiment with payao  rafts:  the  raft  is anchored  in 
deep  waters,  trailing  coconut  fronds  on  which  grow 
seaweeds.  The  bonito  congregate  around  the  payao. 
Fishing around the payao saved  STL trial catchers time 
locating  skipjack.  Taiyo  hopes  to  be  allowed  to  use 
purse  seiners  around  payaos  and  eliminate  the  need 
for baitfishing. 
8.  Transshipment  of  tuna  to  Van  Camp  in American 
Samoa  and  San  Diego.  Van  Camp  has  been  Taiyo's 
trade partner since just after World War  11. 
9.  Skipjack  thaw  prior  to  canning  at Tulagi:  about 
ten  tonnes  a  day  are  thawed  for  Tulagi's  tiny  plant 
of  World War  I1 vintage machinery. 
10. Cans,  newly  pressed,  are  washed:  importing the tin 
plate to make cans  is the major cost of canning in the 
Solomons  and  an  argument used  to call  local canning 
unfavorable. 11 
11.  Fish  cleaners  have  a  high  rate  of turn-over: young 
women would be  preferable but the Tulagi environment  -1 Z 
is too rough for women.  If the new  cannery at Noro is 
built, they will try employing commuter women as fish 
cleaners. 
12.  Canned  skipjack,  "light  meat"  variety,  is mostly 
shipped to the European Economic Community because 
of the Solomons'  Commonwealth status and associated 
advantages with import duty. 
13. The Smoke Factory processes about half the tonnage 
of the Tulagi cannery:  they  smoke  the loins for three 
days,  turning  the  skipjack  into  arabushi,  a  Japanese 
staple for soup stock. All arabushi is marketed in Japan. 
The  Smoke  Factory  is just  a  tin shack,  whose  poor  I  J 
circulation produces a sour  grade of arabushi. STL may 
end this form of processing. 
14.  Cook  prepares skipjack every  day for the islanders' 
mess  at Tulagi. 
15.  Rainbow over the coconut plantation: copra  is one 
way  to earn cash  while at home.  Copra money is shared 
amlong the family members, while a wage  can be diverted 
into  consumer  goods  and  consumables  such  as  beer. 16.  Six  Malaitans built their own leaf houses along the 
Tulagi  shore.  STL  and  the  Central  Island  Province 
officials wanted to remove these  houses  and  send  the 
men back into the cramped barracks. 
17.  There  are  only  eight  married  quarters  at  STL, 
Tulagi:  there  is  a  long  waiting  list because  men  are 
lonely  for  their  wives  and  want  to bring them  here 
despite  the  trouble  of  managing  a  marriage  in such 
a  place.  Some  marriages  brought  here  ended.  Many 
men also left to marry. 
18.  Shed for building ferrocement vessels at  the National to instigate change all that more conspicuous. When the youth leaves for a plantation or STL, his 
parents realize that his caliber of work does not warrant a prolonged stay away from the village. 
Accordingly, they assume he will return and make their plans with him in mind. The type of work 
he is doing minimizes their fears that he will marry a woman from another Island group,  for STL 
and other plantations are basically all-male environments. 
At the STL base,  the youth finds that the novelty of work wears thin quickly. There are few 
chances to purchase worthwhile goods or to socialize with women or to lead the privileged life 
depicted in weekly movies at  the Tulagi shorebase. The solace of alcohol, soccer with age  mates, and 
store-bought goods and cakes compete with feelings of alienation and frustration. So the average 
young man quits after a year and a half and moves on to another job,  perhaps staying with a wontok 
in the interim. Eventually, out of a job, the hard realities of wage  employment evident, the man 
returns to the village as expected. Not infrequently, a worker's  parents have been purchasing shell 
money, porpoise teeth and other bride wealth with the money he sends home. Encouraged, the man 
takes a wife, and becomes locked into the village regime. 
One consequence of this labor pattern is that at any point in time there is a drifting mass of 
young men who move from job to job,  locale to locale, before returning to the village, perhaps a bit 
more worldly-wise and cynical about their prospects in "civilization." 
WORK CONDITIONS AT TULAGI 
Work conditions-housing,  food,  safety, training, and treatment-at  Tulagi have  never been 
ideal. Although STL is  a joint venture, shaped with the helping hand of development agencies, condi- 
tions are comparable to  the other expatriate-run plantations around the Islands. So  much so  that 
most workers assume STL is owned and operated exclusively by the Japanese.  From a practical 
point of view, the workers' perception is on target, for the Japanese do control work conditions and 
do rely on the plantation model laid down in the colonial era. The SIG appears to have little influence 
to determine work conditions. Some workers blame their own national elite, who they feel are more 
interested in the development of industry (and by implication the government bureaucracy) than in 
the welfare and development of their countrymen. 
At best,  STL managers have understood that Islanders integrate work with sociality, that 
unfair treatment builds an explosive resentment, and that exchange of gifts is the critical social 
lubricant. What they have not understood, and indeed what only a few expatriate managers have 
ever understood, is that the wontok system is, for Islanders, the indispensable source of stability 
and kinship away from home; and that workers will never tolerate a public shaming, whatever the 
reason,  because such behavior  is utterly unacceptable by Island standards and traditionally was 
nothing less than an invitation to violence. 
At worst, some managers have been disinterested in working conditions. Recently a manager 
banned the traditional gratuities of fish given the wharf hands by the Okinawan crews for fast 
service, and erected a 4-m barbed-wire  fence around the STL plant operations, creating an  internment 
camp aura. The fence's  purpose was to keep out workers' relatives and monitor the theft of food 
and clothes. In the space of a few weeks the atmosphere at  Tulagi and the attitude of workers did 
an about face. Clearly, it is more the personality and philosophy of the individual manager than 
express company policy that determines work conditions at Tulagi. 
Moreover, Japanese behavior toward overseas foreign employees tends to be more erratic than 
towards Japanese at home, where a powerful set of social norms and rules govern face-to-face inter- 
action and management-employee relations. From a worker's perspective, Japanese management is 
arbitrary and confusing, especially since each Japanese person is thought to represent the Japanese 
group at  large. The worker's  model, of course,  is the clan, whose members implicitly coordinate 
their behavior towards any outsider. Also, the official policies and rules governing workers are vague 
and their application non-uniform.  The perceived confusion and arbitrariness from the worker's view- 
point promotes transience as  it inhibits him from identifying with the company. According to workers, housing at Tulagi has been a constant source of irritation. The company 
block houses tend to be overcrowded with six cots per room plus the inevitable contingent of 
wontoks camped on the floor. Village houses may sometimes sleep as  many people, but the social 
psychology is entirely different. Where the closeness among family members feels snug and secure- 
being a sharing of space-among  strangers it is an invasion of personal space that nurtures suspicion 
and friction. The negative consequences of overcrowding are aggravated by the architecture of the 
typical labor quarters: cement walls, low ceilings, few windows and a tin roof inhibit air circulation 
and cooling. Better housing is feasible. In 1980, the Copra Board designed and built houses at Noro 
which incorporate the virtues of indigenous architecture: verandas, stilts, high ceilings and open 
walls. Another major housing problem is the inadequate number of quarters for married employees. 
To discourage wontok visitors, STL has  an explicit policy of rooming relatives in separate 
houses. While this does reduce the number of wontoksand their length of stay, it also breeds resent- 
ment and the problems of strained tempers and thievery. Listening to workers talk, it becomes clear 
that unruly behavior and "running away"  will persist in the absence of better housing. 
To escape what they see as sub-standard housing, some north Malaitian workers have begun 
building leaf houses on stilts on the shore. In the traditional style, the houses are constructed of 
wood and imbricated sago-palm thatching which afford ventilation. House members are kinsmen, 
thus obviating the risks of theft and harmful magic. STL feels that the workers' building their own 
houses erodes their authority and control over the base. So far they have taken no direct action 
against the builders, but have lobbied with the Central Island Province to condemn the new houses 
on the grounds of unsightliness. Nevertheless, they are no more or less unsightly than village con- 
structions ever are.  Moreover, this is not the only settlement of leaf houses to spring up in the past 
few years. Closer to NFD grounds, just beyond the Smoke Factory, is a compound made-up prin- 
cipally of men from Sandfly Island, most of whom work in the Factory. In the absence of company 
or government interference, the number of leaf house settlements may  increase into the future. 
The organization, decor and naming of the houses expresses the complex tangle between custom 
and civilization. As  opposed to STL housing, workers can find  a sense of personal order in the famil- 
iar dwellings and sounds of the sea  slapping time on the posts underneath. The houses hold a cross- 
section of blood-kin, in-laws and wontoks, making it a microcosm of the modern village. The mem- 
bers share food, clothes, personal effects and language. But at the same time, the members call their 
houses "clubs,"  paint them with contemporary western emblems, and give them such names as  the 
Lonely Boys Lodge, Malaitian Eagle, and Black Disciples. Adorning the walls,  torn from Japanese 
and Australian magazines, are pictures of cars,  sexy ladies, pop stars and the Concorde jet in flight. 
To the heart of the matter, "club  members" say  they talk over the strange feeling of straddling two 
worlds and two sets of expectations at once. 
Alcohol and food are significant problems at STL. Workers'  "free rations" take them under 
the open-walled mess roof for two meals of tuna and rice a day, broken only by the Saturday serv- 
ing of tinned meat. In contrast to  the village diet, there are no fruits or vegetables or nuts, and by 
WHO standards the diet is inadequate. Fortunately, most workers supplement the diet whenever 
possible. Workers continually complain about the monotony of the diet and often cite it as a reason 
for leaving the company. 
Important is the sociology of food, for its  exchange and sharing are at the core of Solomon 
Islands societies. Food marks and creates the value of social relationships; the amount of care that is 
put into food selection and presentation is an indication of the state of the relationship. For STL 
shore workers, their mess has a negative implication because it seems to deny the responsibility of 
social exchange. It  is interpreted  as meaning that STL does not care about them and is unwilling 
to honor its part of the bargain. By the same token, the catcher boat crews' first comment about 
their job is that they eat the same food as the Okinawans. Because of its social meaning, food, 
whether for a shore worker or catcher crewman,  is the first detail of a job that comes to mind. The 
managers ignore the workersf gripes about the food because "village  meals are equally as  repetitious." Never having spent time in a village, the managers seem unaware that village food choices include a 
wide variety of fishes,  shellfish, root crops such as  taro and yams,  papaya, bananas,  nuts, "bush  cab- 
bages,"  and coconuts whose oily milk is prepared in many ways. 
The consumer cycle on Tulagi seems geared to promote transience. As the island contains very 
little other than a bar, restaurant and two trade stores, there is nothing in the way of entertainment 
except soccer and a weekly film. Given this and the monotony of food at STL, workers tend to  be 
bored and to purchase beer and food at  the local outlets. Workers repeatedly go on drinking sprees, 
especially on pay days,  and even the few who avoid alcohol consume their wages on bread, cake, 
soda and other edibles. As retail market competition on the Island is  decidedly low, prices are corre- 
spondingly high for the captured audience. The upshot is that most workers dissipate their wages, 
often entirely, on simply relieving their boredom. This frustrates their desires to accumulate some 
savings and makes wage  labor seem a bare alternative to  the village. 
Especially because of the drinking and fighting there is  a firm separation between Tulagi's two 
neighboring shorebases. Although STL and NFD bases are but a 10-minute walk from one another, 
there is minimal interaction  and socializing. STL workers do not, nor are they allowed to, arrive 
unannounced at  N  FDrs door. They come expressly to visit relatives and wontoks. The reason for 
this is that NFD is trying to create a family atmosphere, next door to what many Islanders regard as 
the Solomons "toughest base, station or plantation."  NFD managers and workers alike feel compelled 
to protect  their interests by maintaining social separation. Their exclusion of "unknown"  STL work- 
ers imbues NFD further with a sense of community; by customary law, outsiders cannot enter the 
village without invitation or purpose. By contrast, STL is open to anyone and there is no social 
self-regulation. Thus,  STL has acquired the anonymous, uncontrolled and ambigious persona of a 
non-village. Where  NFD,  like all villages,  is self-policing, protection extends no farther than the 
individual wontok group at STL. 
SAFETY STANDARDS 
The Solomons industrial officer, an expatriate, has been unsuccessfully attempting to upgrade 
the marginally adequate safety standards at STL. He began in 1980 to prosecute STL for violations 
of the safety code as a last resort. The initial test case,  scheduled for 25 February 1980, was over 
an  Islander's loss of an eye while fishing. Eye injuries are commonplace. In 1979, STL reported five 
serious eye injuries: in two of these cases the eye was  lost. The trial which centered on the failure of 
STL to report the accident within the prescribed 7 days was  revealing: 
While fishing aboard an Okinawan vessel, a hook caught an Island crew member in the eye. The Okinawan 
captain, not wanting to disrupt the fishing, kept on fishing and then moved off for the bait grounds. Not until 
the middle of the night, when the fishing was completed, and some 8 hours after the incident, did the captain 
transport the man to a local Anglican mission aid post, which, like all such posts, is  staffed only with a nurse. 
The injured man had been pleading all the while to  go to a hospital. If the crewman had been taken immediately 
to one of the region's hospitals, the catcher would have lost between 3 and 4 hours of fishing. Eventually, 
when the nurse could arrange for the man to be shipped to Honiara hospital, the eye was  already lost. 
One result of the trial was that STL agreed to issue to Islanders the broadrimmed hats that have 
become the trademark of the Okinawan fishermen. The hats, according to STL, shield the fishermen 
from flying hooks as  well as  the sun. 
There is,  however, no remedy for the Okinawanrs style of fishing: sleep and safety appear to be 
secondary to landing the maximum amount of fish. When a catcher is on a school, and things must 
happen quickly, poor communication is the greatest hazard. Communication barriers are just now 
beginning to dissolve with the advent of Pidgin Okinawan among old Island hands. Plans for a book 
to teach the Okinawans Pidgin English have faded. 
WORKER PERCEPTIONS OF WORK 
One of the aspects of STL explicable only in terms of ethnicity is that managers have different 
standards for behavior for Japanese as  opposed to Solomon Islands workers. In Japan,  as in the Table 3.  Homesites of Tulagi workers (1979) (N = 612). 
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'~opulation  density measured in people per square kilometer (after SI Statistical Yearbook 1979). 
'~easured as  intense, high, moderate, low and very low. 
3~he  total number employed includes all men on the 1979 STL work record whether they have been fired, retired or made 
redundant. Given the high turnover rate, the number greatly exceeds the active work force at any point in  time. 
Table 4. Homesites of Noro workers (1979) (N = 381  ). 
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Before examining these tables further it is worth describing the main reasons men seek  work at 
STL and other wage earning jobs. The conscious and articulated reasons are to: 
1)  send home wages  to accumulate a sufficient bride price to marry when the job ends 
2)  send home wages to pay school fees for a relative, usually as  a move in a series of exchanges 
within or between households 
3)  send home wages to  capitalize  a clan business and thus secure a permanent place in the clan's 
collective enterprise 
4)  gain experience with the work, foods, peoples and behaviors of the outside world 
5)  buy consumer goods such as radios, beer and trousers, and whatever else is novel within the 
context of a rural clan-based society 
6)  purchase luxury goods which can be circulated within the village to enhance a man's eco- 
nomic position in the exchange system 7)  escape the tight social hierarchy of the village, especially in  the case of men from low rank- 
ing clans who have little land and thus no potential for cash cropping. 
Workers naturally join STL for a combination of these reasons as  well as more personal ones. 
These reasons, which stand as both motivations and explanations of action, fall into three categories. 
The first is that men join STL to gain social objectives by strengthening their cash position in the 
village economy. Solomons societies now calculate brideprice-payment  a man's  clan makes to the 
clan of the bride-in  dollars and cargo as well as custom shell money and porpoise teeth. Strengthen- 
ing one's  cash position as a means to  social status is frequently indirect, as  when a man earmarks his 
wages for school fees,  a brother's brideprice, or a clan business. As village cash production is still in 
its infancy, migration labor is  a primary means of achieving these ends. 
The second category of reasons centers on self-initiation into the modern consumer economy. 
The connecting link between categories is that consumer goods are exchanged in  both the urban and 
village setting where they construct and cement social relations. But there is also a conflict here that 
reflects the point and counterpoint of custom versus civilization. Men are torn over whether to send 
cash home and distribute cash and goods to relatives in a customary manner, or whether to adopt 
not only the consumerism but  the ideology of the West which stresses the individual over the social 
group. A common frustration, noted earlier,  is that workers siphon so  much of their wages into beer, 
foods and gambling, that the social goals are not realized. Certainly those men who do not strike a 
proper balance between consumerism and long-term village goals feel a keen sense of disappointment 
and unfulfillment. 
The thirdcategory represents those individuals who have no intention of returning  to  the village, 
at  least when they originally migrate. In  fact, those who escape to urban work often return to  the 
village only to leave again. Ultimately, though their reasons for migrating are different, their migra- 
tion pattern resembles the mainstream. 
Beneath the ostensible and immediate reasons for industrial labor are a set of underlying causes 
which also explain the composition of the labor force. Perhaps the most important cause is increased 
competition for scarce land and reef resources. Due to improvement in medical delivery, the outlaw- 
ing of infanticide, and the church prohibition on the use  of contraceptives, the population of the 
Solomons is spiraling upwards at 3.4%  per annum.  For select areas, such as Malaita and Savo,  the 
surge is at least one percent higher. The population profile is  a classic broad-based pyramid, character- 
istic of population explosions (SI Statistical Yearbook 1979). The consequences of population in- 
crease depend on land use,  rules of land tenure and the mode of production. In the Solomons and 
throughout the Pacific, village development claims ever-increasing amounts of land for cash cropping. 
Because the mode of production is slash and burn agriculture, any decrease in fallow periods usually 
results eventually in lower yields. This, in  turn, demands that more land be put under cultivation. 
The situation is further complicated in  that land is held in perpetuity and only under unusual circum- 
stances,  such as government intervention, can it be alienated. This means that while land circulates 
freely within a clan, transfers of land between clans to readjust man-land ratios are made more 
difficult. 
It is not just that cash cropping in concert with population boom decreases the availability of 
land. The influx of cash from copra, cocoa and palm oil makes it all the more imperative for house- 
holds with no cashcrop income to secure it elsewhere.  Access to money becomes a symbol of 
modirnity and social status. A worker at Tulagi, instinctively aware of being caught in this cycle, 
wrote recently that "we  (workers) are fools for money now." 
Other factors which influence  the composition of the work force are educational levels and 
historical involvement in  casual labor. Education and history particularly touch Malaita. Malaitans 
tend to be less highly educated than people from other provinces. For example, an average of 33% 
more Western Province youths attend primary school than Malaitans (SI Yearbook 1979); and this 
difference probably trebles at  a secondary level. Moreover, Malaita has been a source of casual labor 
since the 19th century, and the entire system of migratory labor is ingrained and institutionalized there to  a greater degree than in any other area. The result is a high percentage of Malaitans at 
Tulagi. Indeed, the presence of many Western Province workers at Noro is,  in part, an anifact of 
STL policy which aims to hire locally and discourage the immigration of men from Malaita and 
other eastern islands. 
The nature of recruitment skews the composition of the work force in that it occurs as a chain 
reaction set off by the experience and the needs of pioneer workers. Thus,  an island such as Savo 
sends very few men to STL although it has a high percentage of migrant laborers, mostly going to 
copra plantations. Conversely, Choiseul has sent a string of wontoks to STL. 
THE WONTOK SYSTEM 
The wontok system,  as it has come to be known in Pidgin English,  is the social touchstone of 
migrant worker life. Relationships of clanship and brotherhood, which in the village define and ani- 
mate people's acts,  are but fragmentary at the shorebase or plantation. To compensate for this tell- 
ing loss, Solomon Islanders have transposed the principles of village relatedness to those who speak 
thesame language. Essentially, a common language or "one  talk",  to translate literally, is  a metaphor 
for kinship-like relations. While the bloodlines do not exist, the other side of kinship, the pervasive 
and enduring solidarity that binds people emotionally, remains. If wontoks are friends, by the same 
logic, friends are wontoks. In this fashion, the wontok system "customizes"  existence away from 
home. Historically, it provides security against theft, bad magic, and isolation, the perdurance of 
reciprocity, emotional support and camaraderie that ideally is the essence of work in the village. As 
one pundit phrased it: "money  is to the West what kinship is to the rest."  The implication is that 
kinship, more than anything else,  is a system for organizing such diverse phenomena as  political 
allegiances, work groups, emotional supports and investments. For STL workers, the wontok system 
is the pivot on which most interaction, claims and obligations, most loyalties and sentiments, turn. 
Wontok,  like the term brother in English and other languages,  including those of the South 
Pacific, is a flexible term of reference which can have a range of meanings depending on the context 
of use. Speakers can apply "wontok"  to those who come from the same village or those who come 
from a different island but desire to create a kin relation. Wontok expands and contracts with 
context; and usually the term carries greater emotional load and a higher level of expectation the 
more narrowly speakers use it.  The most narrow meaning of wontok is those persons who speak the 
same tongue and have the same  customs. Often, in fact, they can trace a relationship to a common 
relative through the intricate wiring of births and marriages. In slightly broader use, it includes all 
those who speak the same  language even if dialect differences and geographical separation occasion- 
ally strain intelligibility. In  a broader and perhaps most common use,  wontok signifies all those who 
come from the same  island, such as  Malaita or New Georgia, though many distinct languages are 
spoken on both islands. By further expansion, wontok embraces all Solomon lslanders as opposed 
to Europeans, Americans or Japanese. Thus it is common in the newspaper to see  reference to all 
Solomon Islanders as wontoks; and indeed, this is  the name of the Papuadew Guinea local newspaper. 
The ultimate and common denominator for these various usages is that a wontok is one who desires 
to share food and clothes, provide physical and emotional support, accept certain rights and obliga- 
tions, and participate in the solidarity (Rew 1974; Levine and Levine 1979). 
The cultural concepts embodied in the wontok system are instruments to bind individuals who 
wish to enter a sharing relationship. Wontoks thus organize naturally into small informal groups 
which share food,  clothes and entertainment, and sometimes fight side by side. The result of this 
commonality is that the group develops a visible social identity. In the case of the Malaitan Eagles 
or Black Disciples, the social clubs mentioned earlier, the group baptizes itself and solidifies further 
around common housing. As the wontok units are typically no more than five strong, a worker 
usually has wontoks in more than one such faction and may play one off against the other in certain 
instances. The composition of the informal units is rather fluid, both because of transience and 
because individuals align according to their current interests. Clearly, one result is that an outsider coming to STL steps into a social world of friends and quasi-kinsmen. He  is instantly drawn into the 
tissue of group concerns of wontoks already on the shorebase. Fundamentally, wontoks possess 
strong social obligations and rights towards one another that transcend individual whims or desires. 
The ethic commands a man to assist a wontok-for  example, to raise money or fists-regardless  of 
whether he feels that the wontok is acting reasonably. It  is this imperative which makes the wontok 
system so  pervasive and powerful. 
The wontok groups, however informal and fluid, constitute tiny organizations within the com- 
pany organization. Yet,  wontok groups are founded on entirely different and often antithetical 
principles from the company. This is not true of the labor union, which, being the inverse image of 
the corporation, allows labor and management to have separate perspectives on the same unquestioned 
issues. The wontok system is built on the premise that loyalties to kin supersede all other loyalties, 
including those towards STL. Thus, what appears to  a Japanese manager to be rank irresponsibility 
may be a high moral duty to  a wontok. 
An illustration is the storekeeper whom STL fired justifiably for theft. As storekeeper, he felt 
he had a greater moral and social obligation to distribute store goods to wontoks than to husband 
company profits. So he would sneak out all manner of goods as gifts until he finally gave his job 
away. Note that the position of storekeeper is hardly enviable, for he is caught in the crush between 
the opposing systems. 
At STL,  the wontok system generally wins when it comes  into conflict with management 
policies. One reason the wontok system has frustrated Japanese management is that management 
has tried to work against rather than with this tenacious social system. To uproot the system, STL 
has deployed a number of strategies, such as forbidding any wontoks to share workers' quarters. Of 
course, STL has had no negating effect, and may even encourage the wontok system by opposing it. 
After all, workers' social identity and emotional investment is bound up with the wontok group, 
not  with a company that the Japanese appear to  own in full and do fully operate. Since the inception 
of STL there has been constant friction between Japanese managers and the wontok system. 
Promotion is a point where Japanese attitudes and the wontok system meet. Wontok groups 
are composed of a set of core members around which other men flow. This nucleus provides a point 
of stability and gives the group visibility. Characteristically, village leaders become the centers of 
wontok groups and friends and relatives from the village, attracted by a wontok and leader, join them 
at  STL. In  the unskilled labor market of STL, strong personalities and leadership are important crite- 
ria for rising into the more interesting and prestigious jobs,  such as fork lift operator and coldstore 
worker. STL management, drawn by the personality of leaders, offers such men the higher status 
jobs.  By the same virtue, those who hold higher posts cement their roles as wontok leaders by 
bringing in higher wages and thus an increased ability to  give gifts. 
STL management feels that the wontok system lowers efficiency and cuts profits significantly. 
There is  a constantly large, though shifting, population of visitors. They frequent the STL mess to 
dine on bonito and rice and share in the "free  rations" for which STL is so  famous. To prevent 
wontoks from eating at  the mess,  STL has tried T-shirts, meal tickets, plates, identification cards, 
and a roster of other ploys, but to no avail.  From the workers' viewpoint, STL has a social obliga- 
tion to share food with their visitors. Sneaking food to  wontoks is not viewed as  dishonesty, but a 
means of forcing STL to live up to  the responsibilities it has sought to abrogate. Correspondingly, 
workers develop a sense of obligation to share food and lodging with Japanese managers, should the 
manager appear in their home villages. Of course, while relationships are reciprocal and motivated 
by the Solomon Islands ethic, and in this sense fair by indigenous standards, reciprocity is never 
realized. The Japanese do not visit the villages and do not think to explore the reverse side of the 
relationship. Given their outlook, such behavior is impractical and irrelevant. Be this as  it may,  the 
unofficial practice of distributing food to non-employees encourages "lieus"-the  Pidgin term for 
those unemployed men who drift around from one workplace to another, and a euphemism at  STL 
for the casual labor pool of wontoks. Having institutionalized the labor pool, STL benefits greatly from lieus, signing them on as overtime labor and ready replacement of sick or runaway workers. 
The wontok system has become the system which holds the STL workforce together. Villagers 
are drawn to STL by the presence of wontoks already at  the shorebase. The wontoks who shadow 
the base are the immediate source of casual labor. Most importantly, the wontok system furnishes 
the social and psychological infrastructure of the village;  it recreates the conditions that allow 
workers to function comfortably. Given the awful magnitude of change between village and shore- 
base,  workers could not cope successfully without the presence of wontoks. Workers implicitly 
recognize this reality; occasionally it becomes all too apparent as  when the Gilbertese man, shamed 
and publicly fired by the Japanese engineer, drank himself into a stupid frenzy by evening, and then 
after announcing his intentions  of seeking revenge, stabbed the engineer in  his bed. Workers attributed 
his radical behavior to the lack of STL Gilbertese, wontoks who would comfort him and act as  a 
brake on his impulses. The difference, workers explain obliquely, is  between the uncontrolled violence 
of the individual who has been abandoned by rationality and sense of proportion, and the controlled 
response of the social group. 
The wontok system will evolve, not dissolve, despite the assaults by STL. Its  functions are 
simply too critical in  the lives and minds of the workers. A more moderate alternative for STL would 
be to follow the example of NFD which builds around the family structure of kinship and wontoks 
ties.  Indeed, STL could use the symbolic capital of the wontok system by encouraging wontoks to 
build, live and cook in their own houses, and to work side by side in different sectors,  such as the 
cannery or coldstore. To a degree,  wontoks naturally congregate and thus they have already ordered 
much of base life on this principle. 
MANPOWER TRAINING 
STL managers stress performance and productivity. The constant message  is that STL's  perfor- 
mance will improve when management roots out the lazy, careless,  inefficient workers plus those 
who instigate strikes or slowdowns in protest of company conditions, wages or benefits. Overlooked 
are the existential conditions. This is nowhere more true than in the area of manpower training, 
especially because at  this stage of modernization, people place a lot of stock in education, more, in 
fact, than the social situation and economy might warrant. 
Clearly, one reason for the lack of fervor and quality of STL workers is that the training and 
career advancement programs offered during the first decade of the joint venture have been minimal. 
It  seems that the STL conditions selectively filter out intelligent and ambitious Islanders. Of the 
1,110  workers on record at  STL,  only 3 had been to national secondary school and only 15 (slightly 
more than 1%) had received training at STL (Table 5). 
STL has avoided training Islanders and aiding them in career advancement ostensibly because 
the Islanders will only desert the company and never show the proper level of loyalty. To make mat- 
ters worse, over the past decade STL has become committed to a hardened attitude towards training 
nationals. Thus STL discourages or dismisses Islanders who are educated and committed and hires 
Table 5. Manpower training levels as  of mid-1979 (N = 1 ,I  10). 
Category  Number  Percent of total 
Workers with any technical training  41  3.7 
Workers trained by STL  15  1.4 
Workers trained at HTI in fisheries  13  1.3 
Workers with high school education  3  .3 
Workers with Form 2 education  94  8.5 deliberately the least educated who,  having the fewest choices of jobs,  are least likely to offer resis- 
tance to  social conditions or press for manpower training. At  the same time, the absence of family- 
level wages,  attractive housing and career advancement not to mention the general atmosphere of 
the base,  reinforce  the traditional pattern of temporary, casual, manual labor demanding a minimum 
of energy and interest. 
Islanders  acquire fisheries training from two sources: the HoniaraTechnical Institute (HTI) Fish- 
eries Training School and a Japanese government program. Designed in 1975 to assist the Solomons 
localize its tuna fisheries,  HTl's program is sponsored by the European Development Fund, an over- 
seas arm of the EEC. The Fund has contributed US$270,000 to the project, absorbing costs for 
buildings, equipment and two teachers to tutor on fishing and engine maintenance, respectively. The 
EEC stipulates that funds be used to purchase EEC products only, despite the reality that Solomons 
fishing  is  done exclusively with Japanese equipment. Fortunately, there is sufficient overlap between 
the two  types of gear to make training feasible, if  not always ideal. However, acquisition of Japanese 
gear  is crucial. The Fisheries Department redistributes to HTI and NFD Japanese gear  which it 
obtains from the Japanese Fisheries Association in exchange for longline licenses. Taiyo also sells 
the department fishing gear at reduced prices, 
The HTI program is set up so that students start off with an introductory 10-week course 
which includes  a one-week practical at  sea.  Fifty students have graduated from the first three classes. 
Next they embark on an 18-month practical fishing period; those who do well on the practical will 
be recalled for a new round of courses leading to  a Coxswain First Certificate. Such certificates  are 
preparation for training leading to Mate Solomons and Mate Pacific as the Solomons' own breed of 
fishing masters. HTlrs  teacher has ordered radar, an echosounder and a satellite navigator in hopes 
that the school can begin training on more sophisticated equipment. Currently, only Mate Pacific 
certificate holders understand navigation and can use  a sextant, extremely important for long- 
lining which often takes the boat out of sight of land. Standards for Mate Solomons are presently 
very low because men are passed to fill the legal crew quota requirement for commercial boats. 
So far, HTI has done all the advertising and recruiting of students. The school feels, however, 
that the active participation of STL and the other fishing outfits would bring improvement, since 
they know which men are most suitable and what kind of training is needed to meet the current 
labor market.  However, cooperation has  not yet materialized; the exception being NFD which 
cooperates with HTI on the one-week practical. 
HTI offers men without academic qualifications a rare opportunity to train for marine certifi- 
cation. Although originally, STL was to provide such education as part of its contribution to national 
development, STLsent no trainees to HTIrs first three 10-week  courses. In  view of upcoming joint 
venture negotiations, and knowing that the SIG intended to push harder for manpower training, 
STL requested to fill all 20 places in the fourth HTI course. HTI insisted, however, that 25% of the 
slots remain open to the public to encourage villagers to learn modern fishing technology. 
The other source of fisheries training is the Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation (OFCF). 
0  FC F is a semi-governmental, non-profit agency sponsored by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. Itsofficial  goal is "to have cooperation with the coastal fishing areas through 
the Japanese private fishing enterprises."  OFCF is  one of three Japanese government training organi- 
zationswhich sharesome facilitiesand work in unison, training for the Japanese government. OFCF 
receives overseas trainees but is not in  direct contact with foreign states; it works through overseas 
companies. Thus,  if STL wishes to  send trainees to  Japan, it tells Taiyo who in  turn approaches 
OFCF. Starting their fiscal year in March-April in rhythm with the fishing companies, OFCF broad- 
casts its plans and budget to Taiyo and the companies operating in Papua New Guinea (Kaigai, 
Kyokuyo and H~koku).~ 
8~y  1980, Starkist had taken over all Japanese tuna fishery interests in PNG. Taiyo has sent students from the Solomons,  Indonesia and Senegal;  Kaigai and Hokoku from 
Papua New Guinea; and Kyokuyo from Papua New Guinea and Senegal. Since 1973, Taiyo has sent 
four Solomon lslanders to  OFCF in Japan for training. OFCF bears all expenses of the trainees: 
airfare and daily transportation, living  costs for five months, including a Y2,000  (US$10) daily allow- 
ance. Taiyo managers complain about the "extravagance"  of the allowance, feeling it spoils lslanders 
for the wages they will receive in the Solomons. 
The course at OFCF has proven only marginally successful. The time span  is too short for 
lslanders to overcome the "culture shock"  of moving into a highly technological society. The prepa- 
ratory one-month course in  Japanese language and culture has not been a sufficient buffer. Given 
the direct correlation between the familiarity of the social environment and rate of learning, the 
results are predictable. But perhaps the most important factor is that lslanders are used to learning 
through hands-on experience. It  is not, as Europeans and Japanese are apt to claim, that lslanders 
lack abstract thinking ability; rather, they have not developed an abstract learning ability. In Japan 
and the West such ability is both historically recent and the product of years of schooling. lslanders 
can think abstractly within their own cultural situations. Western artists have admired Pacific art for 
its abstract representation. 
There are several implications for training programs. First, all training should be strictly com- 
partmentalized. Second, as much training as possible must be done insitu. Only hands-on training 
will have a reasonable level of success.  Third, those lslanders who receive training will not transmit 
their knowledge via  organized verbal presentations. They  may explain an  operation they have 
learned in the course of performing it, but they will not provide an explanation out of context. 
Even those workers who receive some training are not likely to stay with STL for any appre- 
ciable length of time. Trained workers do not get what they feel is a sufficient salary, nor do they 
get the recognition from the Japanese they desire. NFD has had no problem retaining the men it 
has trained. Where the annual turnover rate for trained personnel at STL is around 19%, the rate at 
NFD is less than 2%.  The critical point here is that, for Solomon Islanders, respect and status play 
a more significant part in retaining employees than simply salary. 
National Fisheries Development 
National Fisheries Development  is  a national development program run by and for the Solomon 
Islands.  Its  goal is to build a national fishing fleet. It  is funded in part through a loan from the Asian 
Development Bank and has received grants in  equipment and expertise from Japan and New Zealand. 
NFD began to  organize its operations in 1978 when the general manager was  recruited. As  of 1980, 
the management consisted of two engineers, a New Zealand ferrocement expert, the general manager, 
a retired Taiyo man as  fleet manager, and two Solomon Islanders; they were training about 50 
employees. NFD owned two fishing boats (both grants from the Japanese) and was  building 10 
ferrocement catchers and 20 baitboats. 
ORIGINS 
National Fisheries Development had all the qualities of a satisfying project. Taiyo wanted to 
develop the fishing industry in order to  obtain more tuna to  trade; the Japanese government sought 
wider markets on the forecast that Western countries would tighten their restrictions  and thus reduce 
imports from Japan; the Asian Development Bank desired to expand its plans for industrial develop- 
ment in the South Pacific; and the Solomons was anxious to localize the fishing business. 
The Japanese government donated the catcher vessels Fisher and Hunter to the SIG.  NFD 
chartered the vessels to begin its fleet. The Japanese also sent the Solomons other boats for research, 
transportation, and refrigerated transshipment, and sponsored a fisheries training school in Auki, 
Malaita, manned by two Japanese overseas volunteers. Through its association with STL which is 
the exclusive buyer of NFD fish,  Taiyo gained the marketing and distribution rights to NFD's potential catch. It  was  in Taiyo's interest to have the Solomons bear the soaring fuel costs and risks 
related to fluctuating catch rates. Taiyo goals were thus (1) to gain prestige and foster good will by 
encouraging national development, (2) sidestep the costs and uncertainties of doing the actual fish- 
ing; and (3) retain full access to  the catch and control (through STL) over NFDfs plans for diversi- 
fication and expansion. One can also see similar interests in the encouragement that both Starkist 
and Taiyo give Okinawans to borrow money to buy their own charter boats. And,  as  it turns out, 
neither NFD nor the Okinawans have been as pliable as the transnationals had hoped. 
Taiyo's original conception was that NFD would supply additional fish to STL plus shoulder 
the high costs and risks of fishing. The burden, of course, would be lightened by foreign aid and the 
philosophy that NFD was as  much in the business of education as fishing. From Taiyofs perspective 
the SI Fisheries Department would also be more inclined to facilitate entry conditions for NFD 
than forthe  jointventure. In addition, the rise of NFD fitted Taiyo's  long-range objective of phasing 
out of fishing in favor of marketing. Recall that Taiyo's in-house projections showed fishing to be 
only marginally profitable, with every indication that even slim profit margins could soon vanish. 
The NFD plan envisioned that by the mid 1980s STLfs fleet would be comprised of equal numbers 
of NFD, Okinawan and STL catchers. This would curb costly dependency on Okinawan boats 
(charterage fees surpassing 50% of costs) and accelerate localization, by then a charged political 
issue which routinely captured headlines. Indeed, Taiyo hoped its  support of N  FD might assuage 
the anger surrounding the charge that the transnationals had taken advantage of the Solomons. 
THE ADB LOAN AGREEMENT 
The Solomons project set two precedents for the ADB: the loan was  its initial step into the 
South Pacific and the first time it became involved with a foreign company. The loan, requiring  a 
feasibility study by the Fisheries Department and orchestration by the Finance Department, took 
about a year to germinate. The process began with a senior ADB representative approaching the 
head of the Natural Resources Department with the offer to  finance a local fishing industry. The repre- 
sentative suggested establishing  a shorebase at  Sasape,  an excellent natural harbor next door to STLfs 
Tulagi Island plant, and building ferrocement catcher boats because they required less training, capi- 
tal outlay, and were free of the marine worms that bored holes in wooden hulls. The ADB official 
also conferred with Taiyo's Japanese managers in the Solomons. Subsequently, ADB dispatched an 
economist and a financial analyst on a fact-finding mission. They reappraised the project and con- 
ferred again with STL and the Fisheries Department, since the offloading, coldstore facilities and 
marketing of the catch would be in STLfs hands. 
Rapid progress was made on arranging the finance. Late in 1977, the ADB approved a US$3.6 
million loan to  the Solomon Islands Development Bank; they would in turn lend the money to NFD 
as  part of a larger US$5.9  million development package. Spread over 40 years the ADB loan has a 
grace period of 10 years,  with an annual service charge of 1%. Initial capitalization of NFD was set 
at US$2 million  with STL providing  25%and  the SIG 76%. The plans which supported the loan called 
for the construction in 1978 of two 50-t vessels,  fishing to commence within the year.  Projections 
were that NFD would own 10 operating catcher boats by 1983, gradually replacing chartered 
Okinawan boats with its  own. As well, N  F  D would begin building 20 baitboats as  well as  a warehouse, 
staff housing, a new slipway and landing wharf. 
In order to  guarantee the success of NFD and thus the repayment of the loan, the bank agree- 
ment specifically directed NFD to sell all fish to STL. This would guarantee an outlet for the neo- 
phyte company which did not possess the skills and contacts to market skipjack. The mandatory sale 
of fish from NFD to STL was agreed upon in good spirit, as  if  all parties were happy with the selling 
arrangement and ignorant of the reality of monopoly. Thus, the lack of any negotiating formula or 
standard means of computing fish price in the original contract would soon become a sore point. 
Shortly after the loan was approved, the SIG purchased (for S1$250,000) the Sasape site which the Fisheries Department thought was a going concern replete with shipyards, slipways and plant, 
demonstrating  their desire to  launch NFD with  deliberate speed. To the ADB, which had first suggest- 
ed Sasape as  NFDfs home, it was a show of good faith. However, Sasapers infrastructure needed to 
be rebuilt from the ground up, as  buildings were in  disrepair and the electrical wiring had been con- 
demned. The rebuilding was a mixed blessing. While it delayed the NFD program and catapulted 
building costs, it also allowed the new general manager to  redesign the shorebase according to his 
philosophy, with better standards, and meeting the current needs of the Islands. Worker experience 
gained during the reconstruction  would prove invaluable training when the actual boatbuilding got 
underway. 
Several well-trained and reliable Solomon Islanders from the shipyards, who would become 
NFDfs leadership nucleus, joined the new company. 
THE NFD PHILOSOPHY 
From the start NFD has had its own personality and philosophy, directly reflecting the values 
of its  leadership. The general manager's philosophy centers on instilling  capitalist  values and incentives, 
such as the pure exchange of money for labor. It  entails providing  job security, training, and advance- 
ment for workers, and creating stability through the construction of a new community which fea- 
tures all the support mechanisms of a traditional village. The success of this philosphy and develop- 
ment of NFD depends on the degree to which capitalist and Solomon Islands behavior can be 
integrated. 
Inasmuch as  NFD wishes to erect a western model of labor relations-one  based on a relatively 
permanent, skilled, well-paid, and financially motivated labor force-it  will have to find creative 
answers to  transient labor. Recall that STLfs management complains about the chronically high 
turnover rate and uses it to  justify recourse to labor pools. In  contrast, NFD1s general manager 
projects that by providing a sense  of community and setting workers on career and leadership paths, 
a permanent labor force will evolve. Indeed, early experience of NFD shows a much lower turnover 
rate can be achieved. 
NFDrs  goals,  while realistic, are also difficult to  attain because they aim to transform practices 
which have become deeply ingrained in Solomon Islands cultures. For more than a century, transient 
labor has been the dominant historical pattern. This implies that some individuals and groups (e.g., 
village leaders and families involved in local business) will have an interest in preserving the present 
system. In addition, some workers will not be career-oriented, at least in the western sense,  because 
they were not socialized to  be. We  anticipate that conversion of the labor force will be difficult. 
To succeed NFD must have the wherewithal to push ahead with its fundamentally sound plan, for it 
will likely endure some early failures: fishermen who do not report to work, section leaders who 
leave unexpectedly, and craftsmen who leave their trade after being trained at NFD expense. 
Hammering out a tradition of Islander leadership will be the hardest task of NFD. Neither the 
existing business establishment nor the colonial structure of the past have done much to cultivate 
local leadership skills. The NFD plan is  to  build a hierarchy of section leaders, predominantly from 
the ranks of married men who have established their credibility in past service. While married men 
are more expensive to  support because of their families, they are also more stable and responsible 
for the same  reason. NFD gives section leaders special privileges because they are NFDrs  future 
"intelligentsia."  Opportunities to better their talents, rising wages,  and family housing reflect this 
policy. The concept of establishing local leadership redefines the role of general  manager. The 
latter must remain at the top ("as  admiral") offering suggestions and stepping in when needed,  but 
"the separate captains must retain  command of their ships."  This leads to  the assumption of respon- 
sibility and the confidence to take charge, both keys to viable localization. Top local managers live 
side by side with expatriates in houses of one quality. There is no discrimination here or in  the voice 
given them by the general manager as to crew hiring, wage adjustments and policy formation. Of 
equal importance, yet rarely mentioned in development reports,  are  all the small actions which build confidence, and leave a larger lasting impression that transcends the value of any one policy. It 
is easy from afar to underestimate the value of securing invitations to formal gatherings, simply 
assuming by tone of voice, gesture, or behavior that a manager will handle a problem tactfully and 
efficiently, or introducing  a man with respect. That an  Islander manager took part in crew selection 
in Japan impressed many Islanders at NFD and beyond. 
Insofar as NFD is to abandon the concept of the labor pool, it must create a responsible labor 
force, men who identify their personal interests with those of the company. The philosophy is to 
rely on the crew's  sense  of duty to perform well and show up on time, even though management is 
very aware that a catcher held at dock or irresponsibly manned is costly. Such responsibility is not a 
free-floating  quality, but  firmly rooted in the social conditions of work, specifically whether workers 
perceive the job as integral to their life plan, whether they have a family to support, and whether 
the job earns not only money but social status and recognition by friends and relatives. 
Because NFD does not feel that garnering a large profit is a first priority, it can focus on long- 
term gains at the expense of immediate return. The company reinvested June 1978 earnings of 
S1$75,000,  mostly from slipway repairs,  in manpower training and worker welfare.  If  this policy is 
pursued faithfully, slowly a labor force will emerge composed of the most skilled men in their most 
effective roles. Towards this objective, NFD rotates men through the various posts to see  where 
each performs best. Training for professional shipwrights, electricians, engineers, welders,  carpenters 
and fishermen is underway for promising candidates.  In about a decade NFD hopes to earn a 
healthy profit because of its high concentration of skilled craftsmen. 
Some of the men who participated first in the construction of the Sasape base and then the 
boats themselves will eventually shift tofishing. Others will continue  with shipbuilding and main- 
tenance of yard and boats. Lengthening the lead time in recruitment permits NFD to scout widely 
to find suitable men. At least in the beginning, this is the effective means of sidestepping the casual 
labor system. Nationally, NFD advertised in  the News Drum, the weekly government paper, and 
over the radio station. By early 1979, over 200 men had responded showing up at NFD's  Honiara 
head office and at  Sasape. The managers then interviewed the candidates and hand-selected the best. 
The process underscored the value of Solomon Islands managers, for through the SI reputation net- 
work, where everyone is a known entity since birth, the managers were able to assess  accurately the 
honesty and industry of applicants. They were also able to pick up "coconut news"  of good and 
available men and send them radio service messages to join N  F  D. 
THE CONTEXT OF THE NFD PHILOSOPHY 
NFD believes that Solomon Islanders work best in the village, where they are surrounded by 
their families and a community which oversees the behavior of its members. When individuals act 
immorally or against the spirit of the community the knives of gossip are sharpened to broadcast 
community indignation. The understanding that nationals work better in a village environment has 
inspired NFD to create a village atmosphere at Sasape quite different to the traditional plantation 
environment of the STL base. The long-range plan of NFD is to transform Sasape into a permanent 
and family-oriented base complete with housing, medical clinic, transportation, retail stores, school 
and church. The base  is meant to cater to those raising ~hildren  and extended families, two forces 
that energize the village. An indispensible part of the NFD plan is to pay men a living wage.  The 
crucial difference between wages at NFD and STL is not that NFD pays more, but that it pays a 
wage which enables a man to support his family comfortably. Precise numbers are less important 
than this practical difference which allows a permanent work force to evolve. 
The notion that the village is a cohesive and encompassing level of social organization permeates 
the development literature on the Solomons and other South Pacific countries. It aligns well with 
the western ideal of the village, already a romanticized notion of a snug community, harmonious and 
cooperative by nature. It  encourages expatriates and field-workers to perpetuate the myth of village unity. Ironically, the village, itself, as an  institution, is a product of colonial influence (c.f. Belshaw 
1950), scattered clan hamlets were the traditional arrangements (Scheffler 1964). Today, the spatial 
organization of the village reflects this historical division, as each clan has  its exclusive lands and 
reefs.  In practice, most Solomon Islands villages tend to readily dissolve into political and legal 
factions. Recall the furor over reef ownership and the distribution of baitfish royalties. The dominant 
and controlling level of organization is the clan or line (Ross 1973; Keesing 1975), not the village 
which represents a fragile compromise between clans. And most cooperation is in the context of 
European activities: school committees, church groups and the like. In all fairness to casual observers 
and field officers, the village does present itself as a cohesive unit, instinctively closing ranks in the 
presence of strangers. The NFD idea of a village as  the highest level of organization is thus a foreign 
concept,  imported for more than a century now by missionaries, British colonial bureaucrats and 
others. If  the NFD community is a success, it will not be because it recreates the cohesive strength 
of the village, but because Solomon Islanders now call a foreign institution their own. 
In NFD, community building  and worker productivity flow into the issue of material incentive. 
NFD management sees the situation of motive in terms of western folk notions of why people work: 
to increase their personal material holdings. This is true only to the extent that Solomon Islanders 
have assimilated expatriate values:  the industry of the small-business Chinese, the work ethic of the 
Christian missionaries, and the consumer habits of Europeans. Noteworthy is that the degree of 
assimilation varies greatly throughout the Islands. 
N  FD is extremely proud of the success of its worker loan program. It  offers modest (up to 
S1$500) interest-free loans to long-term employees, usually craftsmen. More than a financial tran- 
saction or a worker benefit, the NFD loan program has immense symbolic value. NFD management 
sees  the process of borrowing responsibly for home improvement as a victory for its policy of 
encouraging community development and a sign that its  workers are developing a concern for their 
material standard of living. 
Currently, wages are still funnelled into the village system. Workers typically spend their wages 
to buy a bell, a statue or cross for the village church, to help a relative through school, to buy "cus- 
tom money" for a marriage payment, or contribute to a clan feast. In addition, articles of clothing 
and select consumer goods,  particularly radios, watches, sunglasses and knives, are exchanged among 
kin and so  often find their way to  the village. 
With regard to worker motivation, NFD, STL, and indeed all industrial projects in the Solo- 
mons, presume the existence of a structure of social relations common to capitalism. There is a 
trinity of implicit premises locked into industrialization: 
1  )  workers lack an alternative means of making a living (e.g.,  rights in perpetuity in garden 
lands or reefs) and must labor to acquire the material necessities of life 
2)  workers have no fixed standard of living and thus will perpetually be motivated to work by 
their desire to consume goods at  ever increasing levels 
3)  society recognizes the right of workers to reap personally the rewards of their individual 
labors. 
For the most part, however, Solomon Islanders do not subscribe to these values. So time and again 
they have frustrated first-world planners and entrepreneurs by failing to embrace the work ethic of 
an individually-based  consumerism. The collective industry of self,  family, and kinsmen cares for 
the material wants of people. Conversely, an  Islander should distribute any surge in his level of 
material well-being to kinsmen and friends. The moral imperative is to spread the wealth; and the 
community considers those who husband their possessions as greedy, offering moral condemnations 
as  "Mr.  Me"  and the cutting aphorism: "young  man,  rich man,  dead man."  Thus,  the simplicity of 
the concept of wage  labor disguises the magnitude of change involved. Motivating a given Solomon 
Islander to  work industriously  for himself, for material goods, and at  an ever increasing level, requires 
a transformation in the structure of social relations. NFD should expect that given the wages  they 
pay, their workers will be  inundated by wontoks, seeking their share of the money and goods. POLICY AND OPERATIONS 
Developing industries in the South Pacific face a double bind, one that impedes their escape 
from the grip of dependency. If  they shun sophisticated equipment, they find it is heavy weather 
competing against the industries of more developed nations. If  they go with high technology (e.g., 
sonar), they create the problem of effectively using and servicing such gear.  Often the developing 
states have neither the trained personnel to operate nor to maintain it. So they must refer its use 
and repair to outside experts. This is an especially difficult dependency to throw off; it underlines 
the fact that the development of an  industry entails the co-evolution of related industries and 
institutions. 
In its  operations, NFD has attempted to steer a middle road between high and low technology. 
NFD is not building the newer, costly brine tank boats that have recently been introduced at STL. 
The brine boats, with their cold storage and electrically driven compressors, offload tuna in peak 
condition. NFD has opted for the more traditional and labor-intensive ice system which yields a 
lower grade of fish and a concomitantly lower fish price. However, management foresees that the 
reduced capital outlay will more than compensate for the price differential. NFD has purchased 
engines for all of the proposed catchers, though some are several years from completion. The idea is 
that identical engines will simplify training and stocking of spare parts. Although good men are in 
short supply, NFD plans to keep six men at  a time in the Honiara Technical Institute, rotating 
them as they receive tickets or certification. This will upgrade NFD staff engineers so that all are 
qualified to handle the new (450-hp)  engine. 
NFD1s ideal order of priority is fishing, shipbuilding  and ship repair. Realistically, the order of 
importance may well be reversed due to the escalating costs of fishing and the great demand for ship 
repairs in an insular state. This diversification is one of NFDrs primary assets. Ship repairs and boat 
building will always attract local business, and may insure the prosperity of the venture even if 
fishing becomes no more than a sideline. 
The Japanese government donated two sophisticated catcher boats, Hunter and Fisher, to NFD 
shortly before the opening of its inaugural season  (1979). On the Fisher, a northern Japanese crew 
was chosen;  on the Hunter, an Okinawan crew. The latter did well,  but the Fisher had the worst 
catch of the fleet. The Okinawans clearly have no rivals in pole-and-line fishing.  However, given 
their high charterage costs,  NFD would like to charter lower-priced Filipino and Korean boats as 
used in the Papua New Guinea skipjack fishery. 
Ironically, the introduction of ferrocement boats (see the discussion below) has worked to 
deepen Solomons dependency on Okinawan crew. NFD is afraid to gamble with the reputation of 
the ferrocement boats; and given the political context in which NFD operates, the political fallout 
from a poor catch record could be worse than the financial loss. Thus,  NFD plans to use the best 
Okinawan fishing masters and crews during the introductory years. The ratio will be 40% Okinawan 
to 60% Islander at  first, the number of Islanders gradually increasing as they gain confidence in and 
experience on the ferrocement boats. If national politics intervenes, the sway of localization may 
pressure N  FD into substituting Islanders before they are ready. N  FD must navigate between the 
politics of localization and the economics of fishing. 
With ADB encouragement, ferrocement was chosen for the NFD fleet because of its advantages 
for a developing country: it is non-corrosive, requires less skill in construction, and is labor rather 
than capital intensive to build. The government of New Zealand, where the marine use of ferroce- 
ment was  popularized, contributed the design, technology and expertise for NFD. 
Unfortunately, ferrocement has numerous drawbacks and NFD is planning  to  discontinue their 
production after the initial batch of ten. The major problem is that impact damage  is frequent in 
consequence of the numerous reefs; grounding shatters large segments of the hull. As a result, steel 
armature is  needed against reef damage and wooden fenders to prevent damage when docked along- 
side other boats (as when offloading). Nor is design the sole weakness of ferrocement. It  does not capitalize on existing natural and 
human resources and is thus only a marginal advance to development. First, wood is an indigenous 
resource and building  wooden catchers would stimulate economic self-sufficiency. Although the cost 
of ferrocement is about 213 that of wood, the net national cost is nearly identical since NFD must 
purchase the mesh and cement abroad, thus exporting currency. Second,  wooden boats would gener- 
ate greater employment than ferrocement, providing a chain of jobs from the saw  mills to the ship 
yard. On the social side,  the idea that Solomon Islanders would have special difficulty learning to 
masterwooden boat building  is wide of the mark. Knowing and using wood are part of their cultural 
vocabulary. 
The Solomon Islands Parliament is well aware of the shortcomings of the ferrocement vessels. 
During the 28 May-26 June 1979 session, the opposition party passed a resolution reading: 
"That this Government seriously reconsider and, if necessary abandon, the idea of building further ferroce- 
ment boats to be used in this country." 
The point is that the choice of ferrocement was determined more by the chance circumstances 
of international aid than by the needs of Solomons development. 
THE POLITICS OF PRICING 
NFD sells all itsskipjack to STL at a predetermined price. NFD is not, however, an autonomous 
business simply supplying a neighboring customer. It must depend on STL for fuel, administration, 
supplies, offloading, and coldstorage, to  cite only larger costs. STL owns 25% equity in NFD and 
the companies are supposed to be parallel and cooperative. STL has agreed to calculate the fish 
price offered to NFD by simply deducting its overhead from the Terminal lsland skipjack price. 
Every six months the NFD Board of Directors renegotiates the price,  presumably to adjust to 
market fluctuations and inflation. In the first six months of 1979, NFD received US$472/t when 
the Terminal lsland (U.S.A.)  price was  US$760, meaning STL deducted US$288/t for materials and 
services. Although the net price was  low, NFD was  unable to bargain, having no direct knowledge of 
STL overheads. 
Early in 1980, STL offered NFD an increase of S1$19lt to S1$375 (US$487)lt, since skipjack 
prices at Terminal lsland had increased from US$760 to US$9OO/t.  Meanwhile NFD learned that the 
Terminal lsland price had soared to US$1,100lt,  US$900 being the price of lowest grade fish only. 
Further, at the end of 1979, the price in American Samoa,  where STL delivers its frozen fish, was 
US$1,200/t. 
In  these circumstances, and although it appeared that NFD was  legally obliged to  sell to STL 
only, the former initiated negotiations with Starkist in Papua New Guinea. The end result of negotia- 
tions was that Starkist was given rights for a trial survey in the Eastern Outer Islands (outside the 
main archipelago), and NFD agreed to continue selling to STL, who offered an extra S1$100/t. 
Local Processing and the Development of Noro Cannery 
INTRODUCTION 
Local processing adds value to the catch, employs the semi-skilled, and entails the formation of 
infrastructure.  Hence, the family of issuessurrounding national developmentcrystalizein  local process- 
ing. Technology transfer, establishment of a permanent labor force, management and factory train- 
ing, and the willingness of a foreign partner to commit its  resources to national development all 
come to the fore. A cannery is the major subsidiary industry for adding value through processing, 
and it has been a controversial and sometimes explosive issue in both the Solomons and Papua New 
Guinea. A profitable cannery must be viable on more than purely economic grounds. Management 
must be committed to production targets and labor must be able to sustain productivity at  accept- 
able levels. The implication is that a work force committed to "wage  earning" and a transnational 
corporation committed to  "development"  are prerequisites for success. The debate over canning revolves on two separate, though ultimately related, sets of issues. 
The first is whether the cannery is economically viable. Will it generate the projected revenues and 
employment and lead to additional infrastructure more effectively than simply investing in cold- 
storage facilities or brokerage activities? The second set centers on the political and social climate 
of cannery development. How does the cannery function as  a bargaining chip in joint-venture 
negotiations? How do political and economic uncertainty affect the commitment of theTaiyo Noro 
Cannery? Will social disruptions resulting from hiring neighborhood women or workers from other 
ethnic groups have a negative impact on the success of the cannery? 
The economic environment in  the Solomons or Papua New Guinea would never motivate either 
Taiyo or Starkist to  build a cannery of their own volition, even with offers of tax incentives for 
canned products. Like all tuna transnationals, their company mandate is to get maximum quantities 
of raw fish for extant global cannery operations. This does not, however, mean that the transnationals 
will not eventually erect canneries. Transnationals view these canneries as  part of the cost of main- 
taining access to raw tuna. 
It should be made clear that to any investment banker there are sound economic reasons for 
Taiyo and Starkist to  want to  avoid any big capital investment. The development plans of Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands underscore the need to stimulate foreign investment to further 
industrialize. They also include the desire to  nationalize or control some key primary industries. 
These objectives collide, however. Investors will not risk capital when the prospects of nationaliza- 
tion are imminent. The issue of canning illustrates what has evolved into the development paradox: 
the more host countries industrialize and push for further development by threatening nationaliza- 
tion, the more transnationals fixate on short-term returns and undermine long-term development. 
THE MECHANICS OF CANNING 
A brief description of canning operations at the existing Tulagi cannery will identify the jobs, 
personnel and sequence of operations. 
The catcher boats offload their fish around the clock, making the cannery a 24-hour operation. 
Scalers weigh the catch, once carriers have loaded it onto pallets, to  assay the fish and potential 
bonus.  Fork lifts then convey the fish to  the two 50-t brine tanks where they soak for 10 hours 
before being transferred to  coldstorage. When the canning process is to begin, the fork lift  drivers 
haul the piles of frozen skipjack to water tanks to  thaw for 9 hours. At 5 pm the 10-man cooking 
section starts heading, gutting and cooking the fish. The Japanese manager oversees the preparations 
for the following morning until he  retires at 9 pm.  In the morning, amid the deafening din of 
machine noise, rows of cleaners, young men and teenagers in cotton caps and aprons, stand at the 
tables removing the bones and dividing the skipjack into quartered loins. The dark blood meat is 
separated and canned as  Solomon Blue, the brand sold at local tradestores. Packers hand-pack the 
light meat chunks into cans,  the conveyer belt taxiing the open-faced tins through sprays of cotton 
seed and rice oil and salt. The canning machine then clamps down the lid and workmen pile the cans 
into metal bins and wheel them into the pressure cookers for final sterilization. 
THE TULAGI OPERATION 
The vintage Tulagi cannery has been stamping out cans since mid-1973. With the exception of 
1975 when production soared to 2,619  t, processing has hovered between 1,800 and 2,000 t (SI 
Statistical Yearbook 1979). As the catch capacity rises with the development of a superior fleet- 
both the Okinawan and STL fleets are gravitating towards the larger, high-technology brine boats- 
the percentage of the catch canned dwindles proportionately. Where in 1974 about 830  of the 
skipjack went further than Tulagi, by 1979 STL transshipped 94% of its catch frozen to either Van 
Camp canneries in American Samoa,  Guam, San  Diego and Puerto Rico (go%) or to  Japan (4%). 
The bulk of the Tulagi canned skipjack, light meat packed in oil,  is destined for the European 
Economic Community where duty restrictions are minimal given the Solomons' Commonwealth status. The U.S.A.,  world's largest consumer of tinned tuna, levies a 35% duty on oil-packed imports. 
STL distributes Solomon Blue locally, but the several hundred tonnes canned yearly are hardly 
enough to keep pace with local demand. This has generated significant local resentment, more than 
an  outsider might anticipate,  in that nationals as  a matter of cultural tradition perceive this as 
infringement against their natural rights. 
The only other processed skipjack has been solely for the Japanese market. The Smoke Factory, 
as  it is called, has been smoking skipjack loins to produce arabushi, a staple for soup stock used 
daily in  the Japanese diet. The Smoke Factory employs about 25 national workers under a  contracted 
Okinawan smoke master. The Smoke Factory, consisting of a threestoried smoke house, a steam 
room, and a packing shed,  only smokes about 1,000  t of skipjack annually. Once the fish have been 
gutted and headed, they are arranged in boxes in the steam room and steamed for 2 to  3 hours. The 
fish are then laid on racks and smoked for three days,  until they metamorphose into "volcanic 
glass"  consistency; the workers, sitting in a circle around the mound of glassy skipjack, scrape the 
hard loins before sorting  them into grades.  However, because of poor smoke circulation and frequent 
breakage, the quality is low. 
NOR0 CANNERY 
According to  a new 10-year  agreement between Taiyo and SIG (see Second Joint Venture, p. 55), 
STL is to build a new cannery at Noro to  replace the Tulagi cannery and Smoke Factory. The new 
accord containsan explicit trade-off: access rights and no export duty on canned fish, at least during 
the introductory period. Noro has an excellent wharf, a powerhouse and other infrastructure in place. 
Noro cannery production is to be pegged to  the lower limit of skipjack yields (Table 7) to 
prevent empty periods when machines stand idle, running up costs and disrupting organization of 
labor. Taiyo assumes that the current quota of 30,000  tonnes within the main group archipelago, 
once met, will give way to a 50,000-t  limit. 
STL's ostensible motive for desiring a cannery is to stabilize business in the long run if  not the 
short term. The debacle of 1978, when STL suffered a US$Qmillion loss on the frozen fish market, 
convinced the Finance Ministry that canning afforded greater market-timing  flexibility and security. 
When canned tuna prices tumble, STL can withhold distribution; when prices rise they can sell. 
Feasibility studies, and feasibility studies of previous studies,  have been submitted on the Noro 
cannery. Still, Noro's economic viability remains unclear. Fisheries Department calculations (see 
Table 6) for projected income were based on standard economic assumptions. Financial projections 
always leak due to unforeseen problems or unanticipated changes in factor or product markets. This 
is  especially true during  development. Financial projections need to be tailored to the social,  political 
and cultural make-up of Noro. The expected rates of labor (Table 8) and capital utilization, for 
example, are sure to be different, though these figure prominently in the assessment of Noro's costs, 
earnings and financial performance. In all likelihood, Noro's projected earnings should be heavily 
discounted. Production statistics and profitability analyses prepared for Tulagi cannery also over- 
estimated production and resulting revenues. 
There are a number of immediate reasons why projections  should be made very cautiously. 
The first is  that all the raw materials, with the exception of fish, must be imported. Canning machin- 
ery and spare parts come from Japan,  as  do the labels, tin plate and rice oil. The cottonseed oil 
comes from Australia, fuel from the U.S.A.  and salt from Germany. Thus,  a Solomons cannery is 
extremely vulnerable to  increasing transportation charges,  rising cost of raw materials (especially 
fuel and tin plate) and potential trade barriers. 
A second reason for caution is that the response of the indigenous work force around Noro is 
uncertain. Unlike Tulagi, the Noro plan eschews importing workers in any number. The result is 
that the Malaitians and other ethnic groups currently working at the Tulagi cannery will be excluded. 
Rather, STL proposes employing local New Georgian women who could commute from Munda and 
other towns around the Noro base. The idea is to trim housing costs and take advantage of women's Producing Capacity 
Table 6.  Fisheries Department projections for the Noro  Cannery. 
Fancy  430,560 
Flake  170,770 
Pet Food  55,560 
Totals  656,990 
CIS*  f  280 days  =  1,538  clslday 
cls  i 280days  =  610  clslday 
CIS  f  280days  =  199  clslday 























Sub-Total  392  392  392 
Total Cost  11,104  1 1,428  11,764 
Net Profit Before Taxes and Depreciation  823  91  5  1,012 
*Standard cases. 
international reputation for stability, endurance of tedious routines, and willingness to accept low- 
paying jobs that have no future. The employment of women in industry is an untested practice in 
the Solomon Islands. 
The third reason for caution on cannery projections is that since the composition of the labor 
force is still up in the air, STL has not hammered out economically-sufficient and politically-accept- 
able work incentive  and training programs. The current assumption is that Noro, a cannery eventually 
fivefold in size and amidst the urban Munda area,  will operate like the Tulagi cannery on its tiny 
government-owned island in the Central Solomons just 40 km from Honiara. Table 7. Capacity and projected yields of the Noro cannery. 
Product 
First stage of 
Noro cannery 
Second stage of 
Noro cannery 
Capacity 
Canned tuna, light meat 




Table 8. Estimated Noro cannery employment. 
SI Nationals  Expatriates 
First  Second  First  Second 
Production  stage  stage  stage  stage 
Cold storage 







Unlike Tulagi, the Noro cannery is  a many-sided political issue.  Its existence and future devel- 
opment are  inextricably tied to the Western Province's  bid for power and the national logic of 
decentralization. The government desires to sell government shareholding in some  current joint 
ventures in  order to reestablish ventures between provinces and private investors. This administrative 
policy isdiametrically opposed to  that of the National Democratic Party which favors the present 
arrangement. In  all likelihood the Western Province, seeking independence, will press to acquire the 
shares of the joint venture if  the cannery is successful. 
For its part, the SIG desires the cannery not only to  forestall price fluctuations but to demon- 
strate that the nation is coming of age.  For the time being, the government considers any and all 
infrastructure  valuable, regardless of its location and individual economic merit. Noro was  not only 
a natural choice, because of its  excellent harbor and location, but a social choice: the expatriates in 
charge of the Fisheries Department and Copra Board were more attracted to the New Georgian 
peoples whose values and education levels most resemble those of Europeans. In  all probability 
government revenues will decrease moderately because, at least in its  early years of operation, the 
cannery will not turn a profit, yet will consume fish which would have attracted a duty if  exported 
frozen. To compensate for this, the SIG plans to implement a tax once the cannery can bear the over- 
head. There is little doubt that the tax is far down the road. One reason the Noro site was approved was that in late 1978, when the issue was in doubt, the 
Western Province had delayed its  celebration of SI independence amid threats of secession. This 
For example, the Copra Board will be "abolished,  and its  funds distributed to (farmers') associations 
province had been clamoring for development, though in many respects,  particularly education ana 
economy, it was already the most developed province. Income from cash cropping is comparatively 
high; and Malaitians migrate in to work on private plantations. The development of Noro;  not only 
the cannery but the neighboring copra wharf and related infrastructure, may calm thoughts of 
secession. But if  history is any basis for prediction, the impulse to secede will gain greater momentum 
with economic progress. The Noro cannery and concurrent development may eventually fund a 
division of the Solomons. Several leading politicians from the Western  Province have expressed 
such thoughts; a few older leaders have asked for an end to development infrastructure there on 
grounds that their lives will become too urbanized. 
National leaders are divided on whether to  encourage joint ventures as a means to development 
or to use them as the first step towards nationalization. This surfaces as a controversy over the merits 
of  centralized, national  venturesversusdecentralized,  provincial  ones. Where the National Democratic 
Party favored the national commodity trading boards and national government joint ventures, the 
Alliance Party, elected in 1981, opposes national  joint ventures and wishes to  atomize national boards. 
For example, the Copra Board will be "abolished,  and its funds distributed to (farmers') associations 
in proportion to each province's copra production."  This swift shift in policy is disconcerting to 
foreign investors. Indeed, the five-year development plan drafted by the outgoing government's 
Central Planning Office, and the basis of the World Bank's  1980 economic survey of the Solomons, 
has been dropped. In  the September 4,1981  issue of the government newspaper, News Drum, the 
new Prime Minister avered "he  would scrap the entire four-volume development plan" because "there 
was so  much rubbish in the plan that no one would dare to read it." 
TAlYO AND THE NOR0  CANNERY 
Taiyo is certainly capable of bearing the financial burden of the Noro cannery, irrespective of 
the political divisions. Even if  STL does not fair well economically, Taiyo apparently does.  In 1978, 
when STL withstood the resounding loss, Taiyo's commissions, loan interest, advisory fees,  service 
charges, and other sundry gains amounted, according to  one inside estimate, to US$3.3 to 4.0 million. 
The estimate appears reasonable inasmuch as King (1979) calculates Starkist's profits for 1978, on 
almost an identical tonnage of fish, to be US$3.0 to 3.5  million. Whatever the precise figures, it is 
clearly in Taiyo's interest to preserve the relationship with the SIG on its present terms. 
However, the current plan does not call for Taiyo to risk any capital investment. Pointing  to 
Papua New Guinea's  Kavieny cannery, where the World Bank will contribute 29% of the initial 
equity, Taiyo urged the Solomons to  finance the cannery through a low-interest development loan or 
foreign aid. SIG would own the cannery and rent it to  STL. 
Taiyo has rational economic incentives to inhibit the development of the cannery, assuming that 
Taiyo's objectives would be to: 
1.  satisfy SIG's desire for a cannery in  order to increase the tuna quota and thus obtain larger 
quantities of raw skipjack 
2.  keep capital investment in the Solomons to a minimum to avoid the risks of nationalization 
3.  allow Noro cannery's initial stage to be sufficiently poor to postpone the next phase of 
expansion 
4.  continue buying supplies and services from business associates in return for concessions else- 
where in the world. 
Moreover, given the shaky economics of canning in the first place and the uncertainties of the labor 
force, falling short of production targets may take little effort on Taiyo's part. If  the cannery fails to 
clear production or budgeting targets, the reason for failure will become a question of Taiyo manage- 
ment efficiency versus national work-force efficiency. If  STL's experiment in employing commuter 
women at  Noro does not  make inroads into  the current high rates of transience and low productivity, then expatriates and development personnel will likely accept worker inefficiency as the cause.  High 
turnover and low productivity are quantifiable, more tangible and easier to accept than errors of 
omission. 
CANNERY WORKERS 
Work-force productivity is a key cannery issue.  If  the Tulagi cannery workers are a true indica- 
tion, Noro will experience persistent transience, despite the shift to commuting female workers. Over 
Tulagi cannery'sseven-year lifespan, just seven of the 120-man work force have remained for at least 
five years. The average employee lasts less than two years as  few men are content with their jobs. 
Four of theseven who have stayed occupy skilled, well-paid and responsible posts. Two are engineers 
and two are foremen who benefited from a six-month training course in Japan. The remaining three 
who stayed on have been induced by special, often contingent, circumstances such as  marrying local 
Gela women, being rewarded with one of the dozen STL married quarters, or coming from tiny 
atolls where land is  short and the potential to cash crop nil. Even those men who have received pay 
increments make only about S1$50 a month, or S1$10 above the monthly company average. From 
interviews with workers, there is every reason to believe in a correlation between high transience 
and low wages.  Wages  are not, however, the only cause and complaint. 
Repetitious indoor assembly-line work to  the clash of tins and machines is the least attractive 
to Island men whoare accustomed to outdoor labor. Cannery jobs rate as  the least desirable in the 
whole shorebase operation. The youngest and least skilled wind up in the cannery, often marking 
time until they can switch to another section or saving wages for special purchases. Thus,  after the 
adventure of travelling wears off or enough money has been saved,  the cannery men melt away and 
must be replaced. 
Noro plans to  circumvent some of the problems by hiring women. Such a program has proven 
effective in Fiji's PAFCO plant at Levuka. Every two weeks,  PAFCO rotates the women they bus in 
every morning so as  to spread the opportunity and relieve the boredom. Historically, industry has 
found women to be the most faithful and  productive cannery workers,  and they stand on the 
assembly lines from Terminal Island, California to American Samoa to the Philippines. The common 
ideology is that women adapt better to conditions at the canneries because their superior innate 
patience and tolerance is suited to  assembly-line labor. More accurately, women have a more deeply 
socialized sense of responsibility and duty towards family. Thus, women receive gratification not 
only from the income earned-a  significant social status marker among men-but  from meeting 
family expectations. This tends to  be true even though women's  incomes typically are supplemental 
to the family budget. 
Noro'sexperiment with female labor could backfire for the same reasons that it is cost effective. 
Most of the women employed will likely be living with their families. While this inspires responsibility, 
eliminates a need to fabricate worker housing, and allows low wages because the women's family 
subsidizes her living expenses,  it also implies that there is little  economic incentive to remain on the 
job in  the face of hardship and harassment. So  pregnancy, nettling and teasing by male co-workers, 
boredom and friction with managers could move women to quit as easily as  men,  especially in the 
Munda area where people do not subsist on cash. This contrasts markedly with canneries in the 
United  States, Puerto Rico and the Philippines where people need cash to  survive. That Fiji succeeded 
with hiring women is  the only true indication that such an  innovation might work in the Solomons. 
Operations at  the Noro cannery will probably be best if  STL fits them to indigenous work con- 
cepts. Since the company will employ both male and female workers, it should enlist a Melanesian 
division of labor. It  is universal in traditional agriculture and fishing production for men and women 
to carry out separate tasks.  Melanesian male-female work groups are felt to be complementary 
rather than integrated. Both men and women tend to feel uncomfortable when their jobs overlap, 
and there is a predisposition to segregate tasks informally when institutional divisions are absent 
(e.g.,  male and female nurses in hospitals). The Second Joint Venture 
On 18 November 1981, one year after our field research was  completed and more than a year 
before the initial joint-venture agreement expired, Taiyo and the SIG ratified a new venture to  take 
effect in 1983. The agreement called for the investment of S1$8 million over the 10-year life of the 
venture. A personnel department was  created to guide STL's  manpower training program. The agree- 
ment also established a marketing division of STL,  its  function being to monitor prices on the world 
market and oversee Taiyo's distribution system. 
In the new venture, the Solomons gained the lion's share of control and ownership. Both parties 
will own 50% each for the first five years,  after which the SIG shareholding is to rise automatically 
to  a controlling  51%, reversing the present division of equity. The SIG also won control of the Board 
of Directors, as it will hereafter nominate the chairman of the board. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
As  a road to national development, Solomon-Taiyo has been successful within narrow limits. It 
has achieved the government objectives of providing substantial revenues and foreign exchange, and 
broadening the base of the economy. Today fishing rivals timber and copra as the Solomons most 
valuable export. STL has also furnished employment for approximately 900 of the unskilled. The 
joint company hasnot, however, netted a profit during its  first decade, incurring a serious setback in 
1978 which forced STL to recapitalize to the extent of $4 million. Deficits of this magnitude 
endanger the joint venture. 
Nevertheless, the first decade of STL, coupled with the emergence of NFD has signaled the age 
of industrial fishing economy, once dominated by non-commercial fishermen venturing out in sewn- 
plank canoes. Over the decade, STL has augmented its  annual catch, branched out into longlining 
for larger tuna and billfish species, produced a steady stream of canned and smoked skipjack, and 
experimented both with payao rafts for eventual purse seining and baitfish holding for export. 
NFD, in contrast, has earnestly begun to train Islanders, build boats and create a village environ- 
ment to stimulate growth of a permanent labor force. The second STL joint venture, signed for the 
next decade, promises increased local processing, training, marketing control and revenues for the 
Solomons. 
An express goal of this study was to provide some idea of the complexity of the joint venture 
and to identify the different interests and their structure. The problems raised by STL in  tandem with 
NFD are difficult to reduce to manageable size; they resist simplistic interpretation  and cannot be 
resolved from any single standpoint. The social economy of fishing cuts across many levelsof organi- 
zation: village, provincial, national, South Pacific regional and global. Each has distinct degrees of 
involvement, different levels of awareness of the total picture and separate interests. The Solomons 
fishing industry itself encompasses an ethnic mix ranging from the various Island peoples to European 
expatriates, Japanese and Okinawans. The overtones of ethnicity and race are unmistakable, even if 
shrouded by the convivial front of international business and the official ideology of common goals 
and cooperation. Industrialization heightens the historical  confrontation  between traditionaland mod- 
ern ways.  Both have definite advantagesand wisdoms that meld in the minds of Solomon Islanders. 
This surfaces in the interplay between national elites and villagers, and perhaps more profoundly in 
the confusion young men feel over their future. Finally, the interaction in a face-to-face environment 
magnifies the influence of individual personalities. 
Add to this the considerable economic stakes of industrial skipjack fishing and the politics 
become intense, so intense that the social issues, the real development of human resources, particularly 
for the workers who are the ostensible beneficiaries, become lost. In the final analysis, an  industry 
flourishes when people willingly work industriously. Ultimately, the successful development pro- 
gram or joint venture  is inherently sound: it takes account of external goals and motivations; pos- sesses an  understanding of the social history and culture of the work force; and selects a knowledge- 
able and sensitive management whose first priority is the development of human resources. Hence, 
joint ventures and other development projects must attend to the necessities of workers. Managers 
and planners must be willing to aim for long-term return and be sensitive to the cultural shape of 
the work force. 
For the more than 900 workers at the Tulagi and Noro base facilities and aboard catcher boats 
this is an era when understanding is never apace with change. Workers, summing up their cultural 
turbulence, say it  is a  choice between "custom  and civilization."The question is whether workers will 
do brief labor stints, as  men have always done since blackbirding days,  and then return to the subsis- 
tence economy, porpoise hunting, custom wealth, and kinship relations of the village; or whether 
they will remain urban workers whose  lives pivot on wages,  store bought foods, schedules,  and 
"wontok"  relations. Of course, the alternatives are not so  separate and clear.  Relations of economy 
and kinship rooted in the village are transposed to  the urban setting. In turn, cash and "cargo," 
science and skills, values and interests, aspirationsand lifestyles, filter back to  the village. Hence, the 
dynamics of wage labor lie  in the interplay between modern and traditional worlds. Herein also lies 
the workers' goals,  motives and commitment  to  industrial fishing which determine whether develop- 
ment programs-which  aim for more than the simple generation of revenues-succeed  or flounder. 
Below we  take up some of the issues we  have addressed in the paper and give them an anthro- 
pologist's solution, one that views the economics of development and the politics of involvement by 
international agencies and transnationals through the prism of Solomon Islands culture. 
SOLOMON-TAIYO LIMITED 
The presence of a tuna fishing industry is advancing the Solomons economy. But this advance 
will remain artificial-that  is,  dependent on infusions of foreign expertise, technology, and capital- 
unless there is a corresponding change in the social order. True social development would entail the 
evolution of a working community which conserves the heritage of indigenous society even as  work- 
ers learn new skills in new environments. 
Currently, workers perceive industrialization not as  the dawn of a new social era which trans- 
forms their nation, but  asan extension of the plantation system. They implicitly recognize that they 
are only slightly more capable of running STL today than when the joint venture was  born. So far, 
the actionsof STL have not helped to  promote the kind of evolved social order which would perpet- 
uate economic development and thus allow Solomon Islanders to achieve self-reliance. The primary 
reason is that rather than capitalizing on the strengths of indigenous organization, particularly the 
wontok system,  STL wages an uphill struggle against it. The general conclusion to be drawn is that 
industrialization cannot ignite self-sustained national development unless it is accompanied by a 
coordinated reorganization of the work force, a reorganization which uses the institutions of the 
existing society. 
Below are several recommendations which follow from this conclusion: 
1.  STL should accept the wontok system as  a social reality of Solomon Islands culture, and 
try to work within its advantages and limitations 
2.  houses need to  be built  in  the appropriate  architectural style-on  stilts with verandas, angled 
roofs, ample windows-and  units for married couples and families need to be built 
3.  the mess system should be revised so  that workers are given credits to purchase foods at an 
STL-run market and store at the shorebase. This would eliminate management's fear of 
indiscriminately feeding wontoks, and restore the sociality of cooking and sharing meals 
which exists in the village 
4.  the government should prohibit the over-the-counter  sale of beer, limiting beer sales to 
restaurants 
5.  STL should supply more entertainment, especially sports facilities (i.e.,  gear and fields), for 
men and their families 6.  STL needs better objective on-site financial management to prevent losses such as  those 
suffered in 1978. Steps that might be taken include a purchase of more goods in American 
dollars (especially oil) and the negotiation of long-term purchase agreements 
7.  the transfer of technology and manpower training should be  put in the hands of an outside 
agency  responsible to the government and rewarded directly in terms of its success  in 
achieving these objectives 
8.  government members of STL1s Board of Directors must take a more active role in the 
management of the company. 
That national development is as much social as  economic is sometimes overlooked by develop 
ment planners. A reason is that the complexities of the social system defy simple interpretation  and 
unqualified answers; they often resist quantification and involve different and shifting perspectives. 
Yet, the evidence of failed projects and such studies as we  have conducted indicate that development 
must be understood from the perspective of the beneficiaries. The usual "social impact" statements 
are not enough. Planners must go to the workers' quarters and to their villages; they must interview 
and observe and build an overall understanding of how the society works. 
FOREIGN TRADE AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
So far the SIG has taken a straightforward view of the relationship between foreign trade and 
import substitution. Their view is that the development of local industry leads directly to more 
revenues because the Solomons will be able to import less and export more value-added products. 
Thus, the local production and processing of fish will generate revenues by selling canned tuna (as 
opposed to lower-valued frozen) and buying less imported mackerel. The implication is that indus- 
trialization, in this case the Noro cannery, will inevitably result in a better foreign reserves position. 
However, this goal will not be met, even if  the cannery is swiftly completed, without careful 
government supervision. The Noro cannery may well lead to a deterioration in current balance of 
payments. The reason is that the Noro cannery could stimulate the importation of Japanese plant 
equipment, parts and components. That is,  the export value of Japanese capital goods and semi- 
finished products needed to run the cannery could exceed the export value of canned fish to the 
Solomons. Said differently,even if  the Solomons exports more canned fish than it previously import- 
ed,  the value of imports will rise and erode the trade position. Moreover, the trade restrictions placed 
on the importation of canned fish to protect STL products will fuel the erosion. A Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MITI) White Paper indicated that Japanese overseas manufacturing ventures generate 
twice the exports they replace (M  IT1 1975). 
A way for the Solomons to begin to avoid this problem is to insist that all the equipment, parts 
and components used in the Noro cannery be (1  ) standard materials  that are available from more than 
one supplier and (2) diversified by country. The danger is that dependence on supplies of industrial 
inputs from TaiyoIJapan will place the Solomons in a worse position than before industrialization. 
The primary reason is  that even a termination of canned fish production would have little effect on 
the domestic economy. Likely, the Solomons would simply buy tinned fish from another supplier 
in another country. But imports of cannery materials-cooking  bins, thermostats, etc.-cannot  be 
cut back without endangering production. They may also not be easily purchasable from other 
suppliers. In economic terms, incautious industrialization might reduce the elasticity of the Solomons 
overall import demand for Japanese goods.  If, for example, the Solomons buys the equipment, parts 
and components solely from a Taiyo source-through  companies directly or indirectly affil  iated-and 
cannot obtain alternate supplies, Taiyo can administer the prices for input materials. It  could happen 
that as  the Taiyo share in the joint venture diminishes, its control over the Solomons economy will 
Increase. BAITFISHING 
It is more important to control fishing effort on baitfish resources than to insist on the use of 
inefficient methods.  With this in mind, probably the best long-range policy for the Solomons is 
gradually to introduce purse seining for tuna. The purse seine could be used in conjunction with 
payao raftsand with regulated mesh size that would net mostly mature skipjack. Replacing half the 
pole catcher boats would eliminate much of the pressure on the parallel bait fishery. 
Given the Solomons intention of expanding the skipjack industry, it  is imperative that govern- 
ment economically regulate baitfishing. The price of baitfishing must be sufficiently high to discour- 
age  wasteful practices. In the 1980 baitfish negotiations, STL concurred that bait was  often wasted 
and in no small quantities. The reason, simply, is that bait is cheap and the price is calculated in 
time (nights fishing) rather than amount. Shifting to  a price schedule based on bucketfuls or on 
percentage of value of the skipjack caught (the system used in Papua New Guinea) would both mini- 
mize the dangers of disrupting reef ecology and raise additional revenue. It might also help rebuild 
villagers' confidence in the integrity of STL baitfishing, especially if  accompanied by a government 
program to explain the effects of industrial fishing to  villagers. 
At the village level, the discord surrounding baitfish royalties would subside if  STL distributed 
the monies along customary guidelines. Instead of direct payment to "reef  ownersu-by  no means a 
cleanly cut concept-the  royaltiesshould circulate in  the manner of custom wealth, such as  porpoise 
teeth. Each household would receive an equal share,  with an extra payment going to the "owners" 
or, more accurately, custodians in honor of their status. Such a  distribution pattern would be compre- 
hensible tovillagers. It  would fit  their concepts of production and exchange and stem the recent out- 
breaks of intra-village jealousies and disputes. Should baitfish monies exceed a certain amount per 
household ($500 per year would be a good trial figure), the remainder could be set aside as  a special 
trust fund earmarked for community projects. The Provincial Council could tap such revenues for 
area-wide improvements, such as  a transport boat or truck. 
Baitfish farming, already proven experimentally by Taiyo in Seghe,  Marovo Lagoon, should 
also be implemented as  a private local industry. With the increasing activity of the tuna industry in 
the South Pacific, the Solomons could also do well in baitfish farming for export. Japanese industry 
especially is  sorely in  need of a reliable baitfish supply and the current price is about $15 per bucket. 
Export of baitfish was  one of Taiyo's  main objectives when the company first approached the 
Solomon Islands. It was the motivation behind the Marovo Lagoon program which still needs to be 
developed with training and marketing. 
PUBLIC RELATIONS 
If the fisheries industry is to develop smoothly and in cooperation with local communities, it is 
essential that Taiyo, STL, and the SIG educate people in  the village and town about the nature of 
industrial fishing. Specifically, people want to know what STL and NFD are doing, precisely because 
they exploit a resource that is economically, socially and ritually important to the communities of 
the Solomons. Education would stem the local fears and misconceptions surrounding the existence 
of solely Japanese-owned fishing companies. 
Currently, local government councils see  themselves as  up against two problems: to convince 
the central government to initiate a development project in  their area and to have some say  in the 
project's orientation once it is initiated. Traditionally, the Solomon Islands policy works on the 
principle of consensus.  Each individual has a right to have his opinion heard on all issues affecting 
the community. Given this understanding, the local leaders feel that STL's  unilateral decisions on 
fishing policy breach their rights. Winning an issue in  this system is less important than participating 
in  the decision-making process; for participation builds solidarity and defines the issue as  a common 
cause. Politically, decentralized development through industrial expansion pulls in two directions. On 
one side, there is a move to strengthen the Provincial Government by giving it  control and responsi- 
bility  over health, education and business affairs. On the other side, the move to create joint ventures 
and participate in international markets entails agreements between nations (e.g.,  double taxation 
laws), global marketing and communication networks, costly information retrieval systems which 
are effective only when data are centralized, access to overseas development banks and agencies, 
uniform regulations and laws for fishing operations, surveillance equipment (e.g.,  boats and planes), 
and an experienced national agency adept in dealing with foreign investors. These functions are best 
handled at  a state level, thus encouraging the growth of a centralized government and strengthening 
its  hand as against the provinces. The expansion of the Fisheries Department, especially its monopoly 
on industrial fishing information and expertise, is both example and result of the central complex 
needed to cope with transnationals. To balance its  central power, provincial authorities could serve 
as liaison between community and industry and be  included in decisions affecting their: 
- local baitfish assessment and management 
- worker welfare and interaction with local populace. 
MANPOWER TRAINING 
In many respects, it is unfair to  expect STL managers to be truly responsible both for the 
profitability of the joint venture and for worker training, a process which demands that the company 
sacrifice its immediate returns for long-term gains. There are,  moreover, reasonable incentives for 
Taiyo personnel to avoid training Islanders. These incentives are not solely economic, such as  fear of 
displacement through localization, but ethnic as well. The Japanese believe, as a matter of fact, that 
training Islanders is futile, owing to the Islander's penchant for abandoning his job and his general 
inability to absorb information from texts. Like much ideology surrounding ethnicity and race,  the 
reasoning is as  circular as  the emotions are straightforward. In reality, Islanders have always trained 
one another in intricacies such as  porpoise and skipjack hunting, devoting endless days to perfecting 
skills. 
It is essential that a training system be part of the responsibility of the Solomons government. 
A good alternative is to define the training program apart from the joint venture, thus removing it 
from the list of negotiable issues. Manpower training should be done by an  independent organization, 
hired by the government for that single purpose. Ideally the program would be coordinated with the 
HTI Fisheries Training School and would, following the Islanders' traditional methods of teaching, 
feature hands-on experience and apprenticeship. 
On the social side, those selected for training should be sent as a group who would live and 
learn together, providing psychological support and tempering the loneliness and cultural isolation 
that have often deflected previous training programs.  Organizers could target the program for 
specific results, accomplished basically through hands-on experience, rather than a set time period 
for training (e.g.,  six months). 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Technology transfer from Japan to the Solomons has been lackluster: a few elaborate vessels, 
gifts of the Japanese government/business, and STL's outdated plant infrastructure only suggest the 
true transfer of appropriate technology. Papua New Guinea and other South Pacific States have had 
parallel experiences in acquiring technology; and there is now a common, and no doubt accurate, 
perception that fishing transnationals will not actively introduce technology and training of their 
own volition. On one hand,  a transnational may understand that the SIG's  priority, given its needs 
and limitations, is immediate revenues rather than human development. On the other hand,  a 
transnational recognizes that it has no guarantee to long-term access to the very lucrative waters of 
the Solomons, and thus the swift transfer of technology-modern  equipment and expertise being one of a transnational's  attractive resources-would  erode  its position at  tomorrow's bargaining 
table. The paradox,  here as elsewhere,  is that the harder the Solomons pushes for localization, 
gradually wresting control of the joint venture,  threatening Taiyo with the specter of eventual 
nationalization, the more Taiyo tries to procrastinate on social issues,  dragging out technology 
transfer and manpower training as long as possible. 
Japanese managers claim that technology transfer is difficult if  not impossible because lslanders 
are not sufficiently educated. There is no sense teaching lslanders the finer points of refrigeration if 
they fail to comprehend the basic points of science.  Even the FA0 refrigeration expert felt the 
futility of having to struggle with lslanders lacking practical grounding in the appropriate mechanics 
and science. But this view has less to say  about technology transfer per se,  than about the close link 
between manpower training and efficient transfer. Certainly that STL does not recruit from secondary 
schools and university, and does not offer competitive salaries to those who might wish to come, 
also impedes transfer. Accordingly, owing to the absence  of a concerted education/recruitment 
program, technology transfer has been rhetorical. 
Even this, however, does not mean that all forms of transfer must be put in abeyance. At 
current educational levels,  lslanders can handle baitfish farming and other industries which overlap 
with traditional knowledge and skills. 
To make technology transfer a reality, two things are necessary. First, the government must 
make a strategic decision to promote human development even if  this reduces the total revenues. 
This entails not only specific training and recruiting programs but social incentives for workers: 
good housing and other measures which signify concern,  cash bonuses for attaining higher levels of 
expertise, and bringing a public recognition of success.  Second, the joint venture must become a 
threesided relationship, involving not only the transnational and government (in the person of the 
Fisheries Department), but also  a new semi-government agency  made  responsible for manpower 
training, recruitment, housing and living conditions, and other social issues.  Note that NFD's success 
stems from the fact that it is committed to human development and social incentives. 
NATIONAL FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT 
The Solomon Islands government is bent on rapid "decentralized development"  and an express 
aim is to stimulate village cash income and disperse businesses to the provinces. However, as  long as 
the SIG simultaneously continuesto court industrial development, whether in fisheries or elsewhere, 
to generate foreign exchange and new revenues, it will encourage more centralized development. 
Ironically, STL's failure to mobilize a permanent and reliable work force, although operating for 
maximum exchange credits, may seem in the best interests of decentralization. This is because STL 
fails to offer a familylcareer base essential for building a competent cash labor force in a country 
where men always have the option of subsistence cultivation. 
The national elite may also return to the village despite career and family bases in the city. But 
their retirement is less inevitable  than the poorly paid laborer and more geared to developing village- 
based businesses with their savings and newfound acumen of loans and entrepreneurship. The return 
ofthe  elite promotes decentralized development more than the tireless flow of unskilled labor with 
scant knowledge and savings to draw on. Given the Solomons small-society structure, tightly woven 
clans with real objectives, the development of a permanent labor force is less realistic and perhaps 
less desirable than the development of a working community that is semi-permanent though skilled. 
The Solomonscannot afford the current trend of transient workers who run away after a few years, 
feeling frustrated and having derived little from the experience other than a sense of inferiority and 
incompetence. The development of workers into a labor force that can earn better wages,  operate 
with more efficiency and with skills learned on the job,  will upgrade the village development when 
they return home. Exactly where the SIG hopes to have a positive social impact on the village is in 
the arena of preparing people for full satisfied village lives. Semi-permanent workers can contribute 
to village development: transient workers cannot. If the Solomon government officials and planners set the creation of a stable,  skilled and 
energetic work force as a priority then real hope for national development must lie with NFD. As 
things now stand,  the Solomons options are to make major revisions in the structure of STL, 
revisions in social benefits and training procedures that the second joint venture agreement only 
suggests, or throw more funds and energies into NFD until it becomes the driving force in fisheries 
development, or some combination thereof. 
To continue to  develop as a  successful company that has a strong social conscience and performs 
well economically NFD must profit from its  beginning experience. There are at least seven steps 
that would improve its chances to prosper: 
1.  a competitive bidding structure must be established so  that the price of the fish will reflect 
its net economic value to local or foreign processors 
2.  NFD must cut itself off from the politics and concerns of the Fisheries Department, and 
build its reputation as  a business firm that operates on the standard of codbenefit 
3.  STLfs  25% shareholding must be bought out to prevent conflicts of interest and establish 
N  FD autonomy 
4.  fuel, food and other supplies must be bought at competitive prices of wholesale distributors 
to lower costs and so  that NFD can establish its  own supply network 
5.  develop the ship building and repairing operations so that NFD becomes a mainstay of the 
transportation industry in the area 
6.  continue its  current educational and social programs even if  progress appears slower than 
anticipated 
7.  acquire its own slipways, offloading and storage facilities. 
An outstanding and recurrent feature of development projects such as  NFD is that a relatively 
small number of people determine its philosophy, operations, and ultimate success.  This is never 
more true than when a project is in its  infancy. The intrinsic merits of a program may well be less 
crucial than the insights, even-temperedness, and political sawy of its leaders.  Minor faults or 
character are exaggerated in the microcosm of the fieldsite, much as they are in the tight confines of 
the catcher boat, and a lack of patience, intolerance, homesickness, or haughtiness may damn a 
good project. Conversely, poorly conceived programs sometimes fly on the strength of inspired 
leadership. The selection of leaders in the development area is critical, though certainly the selection 
process, frequently haphazard, belies this importance. If NFD prospers it will be because of strong, 
even-handed management and direction at the top. 
FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY 
The South Pacific Forum of Independent South Pacific States founded the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) because it recognized that both the migratory habits of tuna, and the economic and 
political conditions of the region,  require a coordinated development effort, despite country to 
country differences in wealth of natural resources and degree of industrialization. 
This report can say  little about the FFA or its activities. The agency was  only established 
during the latter years of the initial joint venture, 1978 to 1980, and then only on an interim basis. 
Accordingly, the FFA has had no impact on the trajectory of the first decade of the STL joint 
venture or on the general course of Solomon Islands fishing policy. Even the 1978 longline agree- 
ment was solely a Solomons affair. 
As this report has indicated at various points, the Solomons can benefit from a cooperative 
agency with resource management, training capabilities, surveillance, market price information and 
negotiation experience. We hope the FFA will fill this role, paying attention to social harmony in an 
effort to advance the workers' lives. References 
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